On 20 Aug 2017 2:46 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:


On 19 Aug 2017, at 01:21, David Nyman wrote:

On 18 August 2017 at 18:13, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 18 Aug 2017, at 15:39, David Nyman wrote:
>
> He points at a mug and says that 'representations' (meaning numbers)
> aren't to be confused with things themselves.
>
>
>
> He confuses a number and a possible representation of a number.
>
> LIke many people confuse the (usual, standard) arithmetical reality with a
> theory of the arithmetical reality. Yet after Gödel we know that no
> theories at all can represent or encompass the whole of the arithmetical
> reality.
>
> It is not much different that confusing a telescope and a star, or a
> microscope and a bacteria, or a finger and a moon, or a number and a
> numeral ("chiffre" in french).
> But in math, it is quite frequent. In logic, such distinction are very
> important. In Gödel's proof, we need to distinguish a mathematical being,
> like the number s(0), the representation of the number s(0), which is the
> sequence of the symbol "s", "(", "0", ")" (and that is not a number, but a
> word), and the representation of the representation of a number, which,
> when we represent things in arithmetic will be something like
> 2^3 * 3^4 * 5^5 *7^6, which will be some s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(
> ....(0)...). (very long!).
>
>
> But what is the 'thing itself' at which he points?
>
>
> A mug. I guess.
>

​Just so.


The question will be "what is a mug in itself". A materialist would say
that it is a structured collection of atoms, but a mechanist has to say
something like "a common pattern pointed at by some normal (in Gauss sense)
machine sharing some long (deep) histories. Something like that.


Yeah, something like that. I enjoyed Frenkel's talk actually. I like his
enthusiasm for mathematics. It's funny though he doesn't seem to appreciate
his implicit assumptions, or indeed that he is in fact expressing a
particular metaphysical position. Is math real? I mean, really real?
Trouble is, people assume that the answer is obvious, whether they think
it's yes or no.

David



Bruno




David​

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> https://futurism.com/the-most-important-question-underlying-
> artificial-general-intelligence-research-is-math-real/
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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