On 25 August 2017 at 21:51, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/25/2017 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 24 Aug 2017, at 20:57, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> >>> >>> On 8/24/2017 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 23 Aug 2017, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/23/2017 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I am not someone proposing any new theory. I am someone showing that >>>>>> the current materialist metaphysics just can't work with the Mechanist >>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Refresh my understanding. What it the mechanist hyposthesis? Is it >>>>> the same as computationalism? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes. >>>> >>>> Computationalism = Digital Mechanism = Mechanism = (Yes-Doctor + >>>> Church's Thesis) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Or is it the same as yes-doctor plus reifying arithmetic? >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, it is (yes-doctor + Church's Thesis). >>>> >>>> I do not add since long "Arithmetical Realism" because many people tend >>>> to put to much into it, and is actually redundant with Church's thesis. To >>>> just understand Church's thesis automatically assume we believe in some >>>> "essentially undecidable theory", and this is equiavalent with believing in >>>> the right amount of arithmetic. >>>> I will write a post on the detailed starting point of the mathematics >>>> needed to derive physics from "machine's theology". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> From your use, these all seem slightly different to me. It would be >>>>> helpful to some firm definitions - not just usage. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I use them as completely equivalent, although in the literature they >>>> are usually stronger. Putnam's functionalism is a version of Digital >>>> Mechanism which assumes a substitition level rather high, where my version >>>> just ask for the existence of a substitution level. My version is the >>>> weaker form possible, and Maudlin, in his Olympia paper, suggests that if >>>> we define mechanism in this way, it becomes trivial, a bit like Diderot >>>> defined "rationalism" by Descartes' Mechanism. >>>> >>>> So a firm definition of Mechanism (in my weak sense) is >>>> >>>> 1) Church's Thesis (a function from N to N is computable iff it exists >>>> a combinator which computes it) >>>> >>>> (There are many variants of this. You can replace also "combinator" >>>> by "game of life pattern", or "fortran program" or "c++ program", or >>>> "quantum computer" etc.). Note that this asks for "Arithmetical realism" >>>> which is only the believe that the RA axioms makes "absolute sense", which >>>> means basically that not only 17 is prime, but that this is true >>>> independently of me, you, or anyone, or anything physical. All >>>> mathematicians are arithmetical realist. The fight on realism is in >>>> Analysis or set theory, not arithmetic, especially without induction axiom >>>> like with RA. Even a quasi ultra-finitist like Nelson agrees with RA. >>>> >>>> >>>> 2) Yes-Doctor (= my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical >>>> brain transplant made at some level of description of my (generalized) >>>> brain. >>>> >>>> It asserts the existence of that substitution level, and is equivalent >>>> with accepting that we can use classical teleportation as a mean of travel >>>> (UDA step 1). >>>> >>>> Important Remark: that definition does not ask for surviving without a >>>> physical brain/machine. That is indeed the object of the UDA reasoning: >>>> showing that we cannot invoke God, or Primary-Matter to block the >>>> immaterialist consequence of Digital Mechanism. >>>> >>> >>> That's where I think some imprecision sneaks in. Yes-doctor was >>> originally presented as substituting some digitally simulated nuerons in >>> the brain. But then it was generalized to the whole brain. But we think >>> with more than our brain. Our body contributes hormones and afferent and >>> efferent nerve impluses. And the environment provides stimulation to those >>> nerves and an arena within which we act. All that is taken for granted in >>> answering "yes doctor" or teletransporting. So it appears to me that you >>> implicitly suppose all of this is also digitally replaced. >>> >> >> The reasoning does not depend on the substitution level. >> >> My version of mechanism is much weaker than all the others. I assume only >> the existence of a substitution level (such that your conscious experience >> would remain invariant for a digital substitution made at that level). >> >> If you want, you can take the Heinsenberg matrix of the whole observable >> physical reality, at the level of the (super)-strings, with >> 10^(10^(10^1000)) decimals exact for the complex numbers and real numbers >> involved. The thought experience become harder to imagine, but eventually, >> it is "the real experience" of the step 7 which we have to take into >> account, that is "us" confronted to all computations in the arithmetical >> reality. The arithmetical reality emulates all computations, and this >> includes the matrix above, and infinitely any variants. It remains simpler >> to understand the problem with thought experiements involving "high" level, >> like the biochemistry of the body, and understand at step 7 that the >> reasoning does not depend on the level chosen. >> >> To kill the consequences of computationalism is not easy. Even lowering >> down the level to "infinitely low" level, like using all decimals of the >> reals involved would not guaranty the singularization used in the >> mind-brain identity used by physicist when they invoke the physical >> reality: you will need special infinities not recovered by the first person >> indeterminacies. It will look like Ptolemeaus epycicles. Primary Matter is >> a sort of ether. It can only make the theories more difficult. Maybe >> Primary Matter exists, but there has never been any evidences, and I would >> say that even without Digital mechanism, I am not sure why to postulate it. >> Knocking on the table, or smashing Super-speedy proton cannot serve as >> evidence for primary matter, only for group theory and its application in >> the art of prediction. >> >> With mechanism, the laws of physics have a mathematical origin, and >> somehow, they "evolved" from the numbers exchanging piece of computations, >> but seen from the 1p views. It works up to now. >> > > I knew that would be your answer, but I think it defeats your argument. > If you have to go to a very low level (e.g. atoms) and a very broad scope > (e.g. the solar system) then you are essentially digitizing and emulating > everything. This includes the physics-of-everything and the the > physics-of-the-mind. Then there is implicit in this a physical explanation > of mind. But computationalism necessarily embraces a physical explanation of mind and quite explicitly at that - it would be false if it did not, since brains and minds are so obviously entangled. The difference is that the physical explanation of brains is here the 'dual' of a machine-psychological one (i.e. a theory of mental states as emulated in computation). For the theory to be viable, both explanatory modalities must be the product of observational filtering from a computational plenitude. The consequence of such filtering, or self-selection, is that the physical explanation becomes the extensional infrastructure, if you like, for the beliefs and actions of the machine-psychological one. David > If it's a viable explanation within this everything-is-digitized model > then it is a viable explanation in the physicalists model. And I realize > this doesn't preclude a mind explanation of physics - hence my idea of a > virtuous circle of explanations. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
