On 28 August 2017 at 01:49, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/27/2017 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> I think it is more pleasing when you can build the virtuous circle of >> explanations out of simple ideas that we hardly doubt at the start, like 2 >> * 12 = 24. And then, the point is that we have to do that, when we take >> Mechanism seriously enough. We are back to Pythagoras, but with the >> discovery of the universal machine and its quantum echo, and a >> mathematically precise theology, containing physics, making it testable. >> > > But you're still trying to make arithmetic the really really primary; > whereas from the virtuous circle perspective it is the product of sapient > thought. But that explanation wouldn't really be virtuous in the relevant sense, would it? Arithmetic, seen merely as the product of thought, could hardly at the same time be asserted as the ontological basis of that very thought, could it? Unless your notion of the virtuous circle is something like Escher's hands drawing each other. Well, in a metaphorical sense I guess it could be seen like that. The arithmetic that is the product of thought is certainly related to the arithmetic which ultimately may be assumed to give rise to it. That's an idea worth taking seriously, but perhaps not too literally. Let's remember that 'primary' here means only what must be assumed, for the purpose of explanation, rather than derived. That's all. So physics, in this mode of explanation, isn't primary because it is to be derived or inferred, not asserted; arithmetic, on the other hand, is assumed without further justification. > > > >> Physics is not a problem. Physicalist metaphysics is a problem, when we >> assume Mechanism. But apparently, Mechanism explains it by showing that if >> true, the physical reality is in the head of all universal machine or >> number, and that can be tested. >> > > But the universal machine can only have a "head" in a certain kind of > physical world...on which will via evolution inevitably produce mind. Yes indeed and no problem with this. I suspect that the three of us may be quite near closing this argumentative circle (heaven forfend!). Let's remember that the thing starts with the rather widespread (though often only implicit) assumption that our mental processes ultimately depend on no more than some species of classical computation. The practicable feasibility of replacing biological brains and/or bodies wholly or in part with particular alternative prostheses is not really germane to the argument, but rather stands as a proxy for the essential claim of the theory. This primary assumption then entails that computation, or rather its irreducible basis in some tractable form, stands as our sole ontological assumption and that the appearance of a concrete reality will then depend on the development of a theory of knowledge based on the generic or universal machine as sole agent or subject. This further necessitates that the observable or phenomenological aspect of physics falls into the epistemological compartment of the theory, and that its unobservable or inferred component is treated as an observationally self-selected (and hence canonical) subset of the deeper computational ontology. That's it, I guess, in a nutshell. The rest is...well, it's interesting to discuss, apparently. David > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
