On 9/1/2017 1:15 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Mechanism makes no assumptions about physics other than that *some* consistent physics must be deeply implicated in the Bp and p relation. The observation that the physics we actually observe is rather tightly constrained seems to imply that its relation with our particular species of consciousness is in some sense canonical, although it doesn't necessarily imply the non-extractability of other variations of physics or, for that matter, other species of consciousness from computation. However, these considerations don't alter the fact that physics and consciousness are derived rather than assumed in the mechanistic theory.That's just Bruno's assertion. All that is /derived/ is very general schema in which number theoretic proofs stand in for beliefs. This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits. What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains consciousness and physics to something like what we observe?Brent, we seem to be violently agreeing again. As I was saying, and as you imply above, the tightness of constraint of the physics we observe does indeed suggest that they are in some important sense canonical at least for our species of observer. In what essential way does what you've said above differ from the remarks of mine you were commenting?
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he wants to take arithmetic or computation as more really real than physics or consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that the very possibility of computation depends on the physics of the world and is invented by evolution.
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