On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits.
That leaves us in the position of showing that there is no white
rabbits or, to refute computationalism by showing there are still
white rabbits, and then you can try to invent some matter or god
able to eliminate them, but that will in any case refute mechanism.
What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains
consciousness and physics to something like what we observe?
Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the existence of
the relevant measure = deriving physics from machine theology
(alias elementary arithmetic).
Then it will have been shown that physics entails consciousness as
well as the other way around.
OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The progress
are the following
Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and unclear
theory of mind
Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of mind (+
an identity thesis).
Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic).
Brent wrote to David:
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he wants
to take arithmetic or computation as more really real than physics
or consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that the very
possibility of computation depends on the physics of the world and
is invented by evolution.
But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of computation in
arithmetic. On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary
physical reality for which there are no evidences at all. Your
argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me that the very
possibility of computation depends on God".
If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are not
taking the word "computation" in its standard meaning (cf Church-
Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at all what you are
talking about.
Bruno
Brent
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