On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits.
That leaves us in the position of showing that there
is no white rabbits or, to refute computationalism by
showing there are still white rabbits, and then you
can try to invent some matter or god able to eliminate
them, but that will in any case refute mechanism.
What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly
constrains consciousness and physics to something
like what we observe?
Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the
existence of the relevant measure = deriving physics
from machine theology (alias elementary arithmetic).
Then it will have been shown that physics entails
consciousness as well as the other way around.
OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The
progress are the following
Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and
unclear theory of mind
Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of
mind (+ an identity thesis).
Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic).
Brent wrote to David:
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in
that he wants to take arithmetic or computation as more
really real than physics or consciousness and not
derivative. It seems to me that the very possibility of
computation depends on the physics of the world and is
invented by evolution.
But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of
computation in arithmetic.
After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to
choose the axioms.
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical
reality for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a
word you stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible.
I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a theory
that is assumed rather than derived.
But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the Standard
Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for primary matter.
It's as though physicists are being criticized because they are willing
to look deeper for an explanation of their best theory. But
computationalist are to be congratulated for asserting that there's no
origin for arithmetic.
In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is assumed
that concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an epistemological
consequence of computation. That being the case, the theory relies on
computation, or its combinatorial basis, as its ontology (i.e. that
part of the theory that is taken to exist independently of
point-of-view). It then sets out to derive its phenomenology by means
of an epistemological analysis (i.e. that part of the theory that is
understood to be point-of-view relative) based on the generic or
universal machine as unique subject or agent. Physics, as an
observationally-selected subset both of the computational ontology and
its derived phenomenology, cannot thus be considered primary, in the
sense given here.
Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something else as
primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in deriving
phenomenology.
Brent
Rather, it makes its appearance as a tightly-constrained extensional
infrastructure in terms of which the machine's phenomenology is
enabled to play out in action.
David
I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
Your argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me that
the very possibility of computation depends on God".
If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are
not taking the word "computation" in its standard meaning (cf
Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at all
what you are talking about.
So you put words in my mouth and then complain that you don't know
what I'm talking about?
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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