On 4 Sep 2017 12:27 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> >>> >>> On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That leaves us in the position of showing that there is no white >>>> rabbits or, to refute computationalism by showing there are still white >>>> rabbits, and then you can try to invent some matter or god able to >>>> eliminate them, but that will in any case refute mechanism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains >>>>> consciousness and physics to something like what we observe? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the existence of the >>>> relevant measure = deriving physics from machine theology (alias elementary >>>> arithmetic). >>>> >>> >>> Then it will have been shown that physics entails consciousness as well >>> as the other way around. >>> >> >> OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The progress >> are the following >> >> Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and unclear theory >> of mind >> >> Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of mind (+ an >> identity thesis). >> >> Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic). >> >> Brent wrote to David: >> >> I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he wants to >>> take arithmetic or computation as more really real than physics or >>> consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that the very possibility >>> of computation depends on the physics of the world and is invented by >>> evolution. >>> >> >> But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of computation in >> arithmetic. >> > > After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to choose the > axioms. > > On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical reality for >> which there are no evidences at all. >> > > You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a word you > stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible. I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a theory that is assumed rather than derived. But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the Standard Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for primary matter. It's as though physicists are being criticized because they are willing to look deeper for an explanation of their best theory. But computationalist are to be congratulated for asserting that there's no origin for arithmetic. That criticism is just daft. Of course you can make physics primary if you like, but then you need to propose a different, non-computational, theory of mind, one that doesn't covertly add a primary role for "physical computation", as distinct from "primary physics", as the origin of phenomenal reality. In fact you have frequently proposed just such a theory, in the form of an "engineering solution". In which case fine, but then we're no longer discussing mechanism. In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is assumed that concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an epistemological consequence of computation. That being the case, the theory relies on computation, or its combinatorial basis, as its ontology (i.e. that part of the theory that is taken to exist independently of point-of-view). It then sets out to derive its phenomenology by means of an epistemological analysis (i.e. that part of the theory that is understood to be point-of-view relative) based on the generic or universal machine as unique subject or agent. Physics, as an observationally-selected subset both of the computational ontology and its derived phenomenology, cannot thus be considered primary, in the sense given here. Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something else as primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in deriving phenomenology. You need to make up your mind about what you are criticising. Mechanism necessarily assumes computation as primary and hence must derive physics and phenomenology. That is its project. Whether that project can ultimately succeed is a separate question. David Brent Rather, it makes its appearance as a tightly-constrained extensional infrastructure in terms of which the machine's phenomenology is enabled to play out in action. David I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it. > > Your argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me that the very >> possibility of computation depends on God". >> >> If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are not taking >> the word "computation" in its standard meaning (cf >> Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at all what you are >> talking about. >> > > So you put words in my mouth and then complain that you don't know what > I'm talking about? > > Brent > > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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