On 04 Sep 2017, at 16:49, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 Sep 2017 13:11, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 4/09/2017 9:15 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Sep 2017, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical reality
for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either.
Indeed.
But there are many evidences that 2+2=4. There are no evidence for
primary matter. Not one.
"Primary" is just a word you stick on "physical" to make it seem
inaccessible. I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
?
Nobody can observe a metaphysical idea. You can observe matter, and
that is an evidence for matter, not for primary matter.
Primary means "not deducible" from something else.
Bruno, you are just playing with words. I observe matter - that is
evidence for matter, so the observation is primary, not the matter.
But then I assume matter and deduce that I will observe it - so the
matter becomes primary. You claim arithmetic is primary, because
2+2=4 independent of you and me. But I can deduce arithmetic from
observation, making observation primary again, and arithmetic merely
derivative. But then I assume that matter is primary - I can then
deduce both observation and arithmetic.
It is all a matter of choice. You choose to make arithmetic primary,
but you can't prove that this is necessarily the case. I can assume
that quarks and electrons, etc, are primary, and else follows from
this. Maybe I can't prove that either, but I have a hell of a lot
more evidence for the possibility of deriving arithmetic from the
existence of matter than you have of proving the existence of quarks
from pure arithmetic. The evidence is all in my favour.
Honestly, Bruce, I think it's you who is playing with words here.
The sense in which Bruno is using primary here is perfectly clear -
i.e. the fundamental ontological assumption in a comprehensive
theory of origins. It doesn't aid comprehension to substitute a
quite different meaning - that of primary sense perception - in
'rebuttal'.
Well seen. It is begging the question by defining the criteria of
truth by the Aristotelian WYSIWYG dogma.
The Aristotelian are like St-Thomas, they believe only in what they
see/measure.
The (Neo)Platonists, when they see something, are skeptical, on what
it can be, and if it does not hide something.
As to choice of primary ontological assumption, that is fixed by the
prior choice of mechanism as the theory of mind. I think frankly
that this is the sticking point for you. You want to claim that
computation can equally well be 'inferred' from the primary
ontological assumption of physics. But unfortunately this amounts to
egregious question begging, since the phenomenon of inference, and a
fortiori any perceptible phenomenon that depends on it, is itself
already part of the mental spectrum whose provenance we're seeking
to explain in the first place.
Well said.
Bruno
David
Bruce
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