On 04 Sep 2017, at 01:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits.
That leaves us in the position of showing that there is no white
rabbits or, to refute computationalism by showing there are still
white rabbits, and then you can try to invent some matter or god
able to eliminate them, but that will in any case refute mechanism.
What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains
consciousness and physics to something like what we observe?
Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the existence of
the relevant measure = deriving physics from machine theology
(alias elementary arithmetic).
Then it will have been shown that physics entails consciousness as
well as the other way around.
OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The
progress are the following
Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and unclear
theory of mind
Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of mind
(+ an identity thesis).
Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic).
Brent wrote to David:
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he
wants to take arithmetic or computation as more really real than
physics or consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that
the very possibility of computation depends on the physics of the
world and is invented by evolution.
But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of computation
in arithmetic.
After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to
choose the axioms.
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical
reality for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a
word you stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible.
I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a
theory that is assumed rather than derived.
But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the
Standard Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for
primary matter. It's as though physicists are being criticized
because they are willing to look deeper for an explanation of their
best theory. But computationalist are to be congratulated for
asserting that there's no origin for arithmetic.
In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is assumed
that concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an
epistemological consequence of computation. That being the case,
the theory relies on computation, or its combinatorial basis, as
its ontology (i.e. that part of the theory that is
taken to exist independently of point-of-view). It then sets out to
derive its phenomenology by means of an epistemological analysis
(i.e. that part of the theory that is understood to be point-of-
view relative) based on the generic or universal machine as unique
subject or agent. Physics, as an observationally-selected subset
both of the computational ontology and its derived phenomenology,
cannot thus be considered primary, in the sense given here.
Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something
else as primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in
deriving phenomenology.
Is that not slightly disingenuous?
The phenomenology is given by the 8 hypostases, with p sigma_1: p, Bp,
Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p. That gives 8 person points of view as
three of them split along G/G*. That splits, on the material
hypostases, makes quanta into particular qualia, and the physical
reality as a special first person plural reality (exactly what you get
with QM without collapse), both obeying a different quantum like logics.
Explaining numbers from physics seems to me as weird as explaining
general relativity by studying Einstein's brain biochemistry.
Anyway, a part of the point is that if we assume mechanism in
cognitive science, we don't have much choice in the matter.
I do not claim any truth, just testability, in a field where many want
to believe we can believe what we want. Well. No, if we want to
respect some reality or truth without which research has no sense.
Bruno
Brent
Rather, it makes its appearance as a tightly-constrained
extensional infrastructure in terms of which the machine's
phenomenology is enabled to play out in action.
David
I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
Your argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me that the
very possibility of computation depends on God".
If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are not
taking the word "computation" in its standard meaning (cf Church-
Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at all what you are
talking about.
So you put words in my mouth and then complain that you don't know
what I'm talking about?
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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