On 9/4/2017 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2017, at 01:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits.
That leaves us in the position of showing that there
is no white rabbits or, to refute computationalism
by showing there are still white rabbits, and then
you can try to invent some matter or god able to
eliminate them, but that will in any case refute
mechanism.
What if getting rid of those white rabbits
tightly constrains consciousness and physics to
something like what we observe?
Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving
the existence of the relevant measure = deriving
physics from machine theology (alias elementary
arithmetic).
Then it will have been shown that physics entails
consciousness as well as the other way around.
OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory.
The progress are the following
Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and
unclear theory of mind
Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory
of mind (+ an identity thesis).
Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic).
Brent wrote to David:
I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in
that he wants to take arithmetic or computation as more
really real than physics or consciousness and not
derivative. It seems to me that the very possibility of
computation depends on the physics of the world and is
invented by evolution.
But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of
computation in arithmetic.
After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to
choose the axioms.
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical
reality for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a
word you stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible.
I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a
theory that is assumed rather than derived.
But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the
Standard Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for
primary matter. It's as though physicists are being criticized
because they are willing to look deeper for an explanation of their
best theory. But computationalist are to be congratulated for
asserting that there's no origin for arithmetic.
In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is assumed
that concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an
epistemological consequence of computation. That being the case, the
theory relies on computation, or its combinatorial basis, as its
ontology (i.e. that part of the theory that is taken to exist
independently of point-of-view). It then sets out to derive its
phenomenology by means of an epistemological analysis (i.e. that
part of the theory that is understood to be point-of-view relative)
based on the generic or universal machine as unique subject or
agent. Physics, as an observationally-selected subset both of the
computational ontology and its derived phenomenology, cannot thus be
considered primary, in the sense given here.
Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something else
as primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in
deriving phenomenology.
Is that not slightly disingenuous?
The phenomenology is given by the 8 hypostases, with p sigma_1: p, Bp,
Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p. That gives 8 person points of view as
three of them split along G/G*. That splits, on the material
hypostases, makes quanta into particular qualia, and the physical
reality as a special first person plural reality (exactly what you get
with QM without collapse), both obeying a different quantum like logics.
It is interesting that there are eight different logics, but calling
them persons and points of view is just metaphor - not proof. You say
that they model human experience, but I think the model is very
imperfect. Humans don't believe all theorems of axioms they believe.
In general their beliefs are contradictory. If you're going to claim to
derive human experience, then you need to define human experience so we
can judge whether it is correctly modelled or not.
Explaining numbers from physics seems to me as weird as explaining
general relativity by studying Einstein's brain biochemistry.
Numbers evolutionarily predate Einstein by millions of years, c.f.
William S. Cooper.
Anyway, a part of the point is that if we assume mechanism in
cognitive science, we don't have much choice in the matter.
Because you implicitly assume as part of "mechanism" that arithmetic and
computation exist independent of physics. But I think this is false,
and your movie graph argument does not prove it.
Brent
I do not claim any truth, just testability, in a field where many want
to believe we can believe what we want. Well. No, if we want to
respect some reality or truth without which research has no sense.
Bruno
Brent
Rather, it makes its appearance as a tightly-constrained extensional
infrastructure in terms of which the machine's phenomenology is
enabled to play out in action.
David
I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
Your argument is 100% the same as saying "It seems to me
that the very possibility of computation depends on God".
If God or Matter plays a role in a computation, then you are
not taking the word "computation" in its standard meaning
(cf Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis), and I have no clue at
all what you are talking about.
So you put words in my mouth and then complain that you don't
know what I'm talking about?
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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