On 4 September 2017 at 19:58, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 9/4/2017 12:05 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 4 Sep 2017 12:27 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/3/2017 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 3 September 2017 at 17:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/3/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 01 Sep 2017, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On 9/1/2017 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> This leaves, as Bruno says, lots of white rabbits. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That leaves us in the position of showing that there is no white >>>>> rabbits or, to refute computationalism by showing there are still white >>>>> rabbits, and then you can try to invent some matter or god able to >>>>> eliminate them, but that will in any case refute mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What if getting rid of those white rabbits tightly constrains >>>>>> consciousness and physics to something like what we observe? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Exactly. Getting rid of the white rabbit = proving the existence of >>>>> the relevant measure = deriving physics from machine theology (alias >>>>> elementary arithmetic). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Then it will have been shown that physics entails consciousness as well >>>> as the other way around. >>>> >>> >>> OK. But arithmetic is a subtheory of any physical theory. The progress >>> are the following >>> >>> Copenhagen QM: assume a physical reality + a dualist and unclear theory >>> of mind >>> >>> Everett QM: assume a universal wave + the mechanist theory of mind (+ an >>> identity thesis). >>> >>> Me: the mechanist theory of mind (elementary arithmetic). >>> >>> Brent wrote to David: >>> >>> I am agreeing with you. I only disagree with Bruno in that he wants to >>>> take arithmetic or computation as more really real than physics or >>>> consciousness and not derivative. It seems to me that the very possibility >>>> of computation depends on the physics of the world and is invented by >>>> evolution. >>>> >>> >>> But that is plainly false. I can prove the existence of computation in >>> arithmetic. >>> >> >> After you assume arithmetic. I can prove anything if I get to choose the >> axioms. >> >> On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical reality for >>> which there are no evidences at all. >>> >> >> You can't prove primary arithmetic either. "Primary" is just a word you >> stick on "physical" to make it seem inaccessible. > > > I don't think that's right. Primary just means that part of a theory that > is assumed rather than derived. > > > But in that case I can just assume that the particles of the Standard > Model are primary. Then there's a lot of evidence for primary matter. > It's as though physicists are being criticized because they are willing to > look deeper for an explanation of their best theory. But computationalist > are to be congratulated for asserting that there's no origin for arithmetic. > > > That criticism is just daft. Of course you can make physics primary if you > like, but then you need to propose a different, non-computational, theory > of mind, one that doesn't covertly add a primary role for "physical > computation", as distinct from "primary physics", as the origin of > phenomenal reality. In fact you have frequently proposed just such a > theory, in the form of an "engineering solution". In which case fine, but > then we're no longer discussing mechanism. > > > I'm sorry, I didn't know I was limited to discuss only mechanism. I was > replying to Bruno's remark that there is no evidence at all for a primary > physical reality. > I would tend to agree with Bruno, mechanism apart, that the phenomenological evidence for physics cannot itself furnish definitive evidence that such phenomena cannot be derived from something obeying a simpler set of rules or logic. Indeed, a number of theorists who no doubt still consider themselves to be working within physics are willing to entertain such hypotheses, such as the MUH. However, when we are discussing mechanism - and this is the specific context within which Bruno's ideas about computation are relevant - then it of course becomes mandatory for physics to be so derived. If possible, of course. > > > > In the case at hand the theory is mechanism, in which it is assumed that > concrete or phenomenal reality is ultimately an epistemological > consequence of computation. That being the case, the theory relies on > computation, or its combinatorial basis, as its ontology (i.e. that part of > the theory that is taken to exist independently of point-of-view). It then > sets out to derive its phenomenology by means of an epistemological > analysis (i.e. that part of the theory that is understood to be > point-of-view relative) based on the generic or universal machine as unique > subject or agent. Physics, as an observationally-selected subset both of > the computational ontology and its derived phenomenology, cannot thus be > considered primary, in the sense given here. > > > Of course it's not primary given a theory that assumes something else as > primary. Note that computationalism has yet to succeed in deriving > phenomenology. > > > You need to make up your mind about what you are criticising. Mechanism > necessarily assumes computation as primary and hence must derive physics > and phenomenology. > > > My complaint is that it implicitly assumes more than "Yes doctor". It > assumes that computation exists in a Platonic realm independent of the > physical. > I'm sorry, Brent, I know you keep saying this but it is really nonsense on stilts. Of course if you are determined to visualise arithmetic as existing as a collection of spooky objects in some weird metaphysical void it will appear appropriately ridiculous to you. But this is not at all what is being proposed. The point of departure is rather the examination of the consequences of mechanism as a theory of mind. This raises the question of what is to be the ontology - which is to say the neutral, or viewpoint-independent, inferential basis - from which subsequent viewpoint-dependent phenomena are to be deduced. IOW the first, or assumptive, part of a two-compartment theory from which the second or epistemological component is derivative. We make no judgements about the realism in any other sense of these theoretical paraphernalia until their putative usefulness or otherwise has reached the point where they can be dismissed or no longer be ignored. If the former, so much the better: we have excluded one more theory from the ragbag of failed hypotheses. But if the latter, we will then have an adequate motivation for taking arithmetic and computation rather seriously in this regard. In the meantime, we would do well to suspend such judgements. I suspect this is wrong and it is only made to appear plausible by using > metaphors like "believed" = "provable" and then forgetting they are > metaphors and taking them to actually model human experience; > Essentially, in my understanding, in a fully developed theory belief and provability are expected to generalise to actionable, whereas truth or reality are expected to generalise to perceptible. The dual relation between these two categories is essential in dealing with the notorious stumbling block of the reference problem, or what Chalmers calls the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. Of course it is the case that, despite some promising signs, these elementary components of a law and a language of the mental have not yet been fully generalised in this way. What we have is an indication of the direction such development might take. > that a rigourous model which trys to explain human experience as it is > will find that the computation must be physical, i.e. it must > simulate/emulate a whole physical world which does not permit a division > into primary and derivative. > Well, as you know I agree with you that the physical world must indeed be emulated in this sense; indeed, such a conclusion is a direct consequence of mechanism. However I have absolutely no idea why this consideration would cause you to resist the obvious corollary that the physics thus emulated would be *explanatorily secondary* to the inferential basis of computation in general from which it would have been derived. In point of fact, AFAICS, its robust epistemological emergence from such a generalised ontological background would surely make the argument for the canonical status of such a particular observed physics, for such a particular species of observer, more, not less, powerful? > > That is its project. Whether that project can ultimately succeed is a > separate question. > > > Doesn't have to be my project. > No, indeed it does not. But it's still helpful to keep the bare elements of the mechanistic hypothesis and arguments clearly in mind when discussing them. David > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
