On 06 Sep 2017, at 11:06, smitra wrote:
On 06-09-2017 10:39, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Sep 2017, at 18:53, Brent Meeker wrote:On 9/5/2017 2:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:It is not a metaphor. When you say "yes" to the surgeon, he will not replace your brain by a metaphor, but by a digital machine. Then we use the math of self-reference to study what a digital machine can prove and not prove about itself, and the 8 different views are extracted from this. Bp & p gives the classical Theaetetus standard definition of knowledge, for exemple. Socrates criticized it, but the incompleteness theorem makes it able to work in the mechanist context.If you are only going to reason about an ideal machine, why begin from replacing one's brain with a digital machine?You might say that when we say "yes" to the doctor, we hope we are self-referentially correct, and we were in case it succeeds. Then, at the substitution level, the G and G* logic applies.The answer of course is that you really want to identify the machine's function (which is physical) with conscious thought of abstractions like numbers and theorems.No. That follows from mechanism. It makes us into number reflecting ontheir possibilities. I just simplify the reasoning by assuming idealcorrectness, to avoid interviewing an "Helsinki" guy who believes thathe is Napoleon ... You can put this in the default hypotheses.This is a bit of a stretch...but OK. Then you go further and idealize the abstract machine so that it proves all of RAPotentially.and interprets the 8 different logical classes in terms of knowing.Only Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p, and somehow perhaps p are related to knowledge. But OK. You were quick I guess.This seems to me to already have stretched the connection to human experience beyond the breaking point.in UDA I use diaries and duplication to explain that physics has to emerge from "number dream". It is a reasoning, based on the comp assumption.But when it is translated in arithmetic, you have the shows to imaginehuman or non human. It is irrelevant. To get the "correct physics" we limit ourself to correct machine (which exclude perhaps humans, but that is not relevant from a theoretical standpoint.But the connection to human experience is the only connection back to physics.Why? I don't see that at all.Yet a physical world seems essential to human experience.It is. The point is that the physical world is a number experience, and physics is reduced to number psychology/theology. Then the human soul can get lost, and forget its nature, and believe the lies, but that cannot change the "correct physical laws" dreamed by "winning" computations (those with measure 1 or 1 minus epsilon).I don't see this, nor am I sure what this means. I think you mix levelSo the argument looks like a reductio to me.of explanation. It is a bit like saying to a quantum physicist "oh, you know what matter is, so you should be able to give me the recipe of the salami pizza". BrunoThing is that you can extend Einstein's comment about quantum mechanics asking whether the Moon is really there if we don't look, to the entire external World.
Assuming this makes sense. OK. That was the argument by Belinfante that God exist. He assumes Copenhagen's collapse, and so need a God to reduce and select the Universal Wave. That is the only way to have both QM applicable to the entire world, and the wave-reduction. A bizarre job for God, though.
So, if we assume a physical universe, then given that Einstein was wrong about QM being fundamental,
What do you mean? I think you made a typo. Einstein was wrong in thinking QM being *not* fundamental or not complete.
you'll end up with either an anti-realist interpretation of physical reality or the MWI, what you won't get is the good old solid classical type of reality.
OK.
So, assuming a physical world is rather pointless in this discussion.The people who insist that it exists are typically the same people who hold on to fundamental classical views for the macroscopic world, who think that somehow the Hilbert Space can become the same as a classical configuration space, who think that the MWI is wrong or that in some way a FAPP argument about the macroscopic world leads to the absolute truth (to them 1-epsilon = 1 for sufficiently small but strictly larger than zero epsilon).
I am not entirely sure. Some people want a primary ontological physical reality because they want physics to remain the fundamental science. They dislike the idea that the physical reality might be explainable by an entirely different domain (namely by pure mathematics, or worst (for them) arithmetic, or still worst "theology" or "metaphysics" or "psychology").
Some physicists can be immaterialist, but still believe that the fundamental reality is physical, a bit like Tegmark who remains (despite he is willing to think differently) open to the idea that the physical reality is a special mathematical structure among all mathematical structures, for example. That is problematical for pure mathematical reason: the notion of all mathematical structures do not make much mathematical sense, but it is of course problematic also with Mechanism, where the physical reality becomes the border of the whole "computable mathematics" (which is very tiny, as it is the tiny sigma_1 part of arithmetic).
With Digital Mechanism, we should say that the physical reality is a mathematical phenomenon. It is not a "thing in itself" (To use a german way to talk).
Bruno
Saibal --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
