On 06 Sep 2017, at 19:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/6/2017 7:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some physicists can be immaterialist, but still believe that the
fundamental reality is physical, a bit like Tegmark who remains
(despite he is willing to think differently) open to the idea that
the physical reality is a special mathematical structure among all
mathematical structures, for example. That is problematical for
pure mathematical reason: the notion of all mathematical structures
do not make much mathematical sense, but it is of course
problematic also with Mechanism, where the physical reality becomes
the border of the whole "computable mathematics" (which is very
tiny, as it is the tiny sigma_1 part of arithmetic).
I think Tegmark has changed his opinion and now only champions all
computable universes.
Yes. The problem now, is that there are no computable physical
universes. Here he miss the first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.
He miss that any universal machine looking below its substitution
level is confronted to its infinity of implementations in arithmetic.
In fact, he remains somehow physicalist, and does not seem aware of
the computationalist mind-body problem.
Bruno
Brent
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