On 11 Sep 2017, at 17:20, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 September 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 11 Sep 2017, at 11:23, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.
This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable
belief). But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge
(c.f. Getteir for example).
Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.
It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can
assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??
Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is
impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an
undecidable (by us) proposition, by definition, although we can
bet on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp
& Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.
Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that
the notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying
in some limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure
and action.
That follows once we assume the mechanist hypothesis.
Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic
commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in
whole, to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless,
commitments of this sort cannot be disentangled from their own
proper, and equally undoubtable, truth values, however misleading
these may ultimately turn out to be in a wider context. They are,
as you say, more in the nature of bets on a reality,
In this case it is a weaker bet on absence of change in
consciousness for some self-transformation, but OK, that is the
"reality" in the sense of "Dt", arguably.
Yes, that's what I meant. We can't know what lies 'beyond' our
perceptions, but we can take a risk on our conjectures, refined by a
process of evolution.
With multidimensional "Darwinian like story (universal number
chatting) above the substitution level, and infinitely many
projections on all computations, below the substitution level. The
logics (hypostases) operate *at* any correct level.
which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable
rigour of an evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction
between primary or perceptual undoubtability and secondary
reliability that I've previously remarked on. And as is indeed the
case with any serious bet, they represent an inescapable commitment
that puts the bettor permanently at hazard.
OK.
It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs
and their associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an
idiosyncratic commitment to what we would normally think of as
something non veridical, as in a dream, may be nested within a more
general or systemic commitment to a consistent and more generally
shared physical reality (i.e. what will appear in phenomenal terms
as a brain and its generalised environment).
Probably, but the initial nested "levels" we have should be given by
the hypostases p, Bp, etc. and also the graded B^n p & D^m t, with
m bigger than n. With p sigma_1 they all provide a quantization, and
thus the physical reality is layered in some sense. There are no
"correct dream" within a dream, because physical correctness appears
when "you" are distributed all (infinitely many) most probable
relative history. This might be related to what you say here.
I think it might be. The idea is that the probabilities converge
on what we might then call a canonical (shared) reality.
Exactly.
It plays some role in the "after life", making it a bit closer to to
the Tibetan Bardo Todol. A poet said that there are only two
certainties: taxes and death, but that was still wishful thinking
:
I know, and I can't honestly say this has given me
much comfort.
Hmm...
there is only one certainty: taxes.
Or this :(
I might be wrong on this. The universal machine does not pay taxes
(well, not yet!). There is (from experience reports) a state of
consciousness which needs no energy, nor time, etc.
So I guess the Greek were right on this God (the One) might be Good.
The lies are the plea of the terrestrial condition, but all path
converge on the limit of infinity (in some computer science
theoretical sense). Except that it might not be easy, there is bardo
todol, but apparently it leads to the "liberation".
Hell or hellish experience exists, in arithmetic (assuming mechanism)
and harm reduction strategy are possible, The Good seems to be good as
far as it is possible, and it might be our part to navigate prudently.
The current problem is that we tolerate the lies. We don't invest in
education and research and many confuse money as a mean with money as
a goal, which promote the lies and the fake speculations. I think
classical greek should be mandatory for every one!
Well, as long as theology and metaphysics are not taken seriously the
charlatan will continue to do the politics, and exploits the fear when
not creating it.
Bruno
David
Bruno
PS B^n p is BBBB...Bp, with n Bs. (B^0 p = p, by convention).
David
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
