On 13 Sep 2017, at 13:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.
This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable
belief). But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge
(c.f. Getteir for example).
Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.
It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can
assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??
Ih he proves it (correctly or not).
But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true
belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven". Which
is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief".
I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in
my last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality',
can only be relative to a point of view. It's perfectly possibly
that any such idiosyncratic, though unavoidable, commitment may
deviate from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency
and that this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the
ineluctable logic of evolution. Nevertheless if something is true
for me, in this primary or undoubtable sense, it will correspond
with my (relative) reality, in both its formal or effective aspect
(Bp) and its truthful or phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent
interpretation based on such primary givens is of course a separate
question.
OK, but in the general context, explicitly assuming Mechanism (and
thus Church's thesis, arithmetic, ...), "p" refer to the "absolute"
arithmetical truth (or better at some point, the sigma_1 truth).
I hope you agree that elementary arithmetic is "absolutely true". Just
slightly more doubtable than consciousness!
It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim
about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that
there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls)
our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that
transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such
judgments are lacking in *truth*.
Which is close to nonsense to me, because he use the word "transcend"
like if observation could lead correctly to such judgment. he is very
coherent in his materialism, and he is force to eliminate
consciousness in that process. But that is close to the mechanist
reduction ad absurdum, because consciousness existence, although not
out there, is still existing in here. Actually, if we really put the
"p" (alone) in consciousness, we get the unnameable cosmic
consciousness of the zeroth person view (but here we are in G* minus
G, and so I am blaspheming again).
Bruno
David
Brent
Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable (~Bp).
We just cannot know an undecidable (by us) proposition, by
definition, although we can bet on it, but then it is different kind
of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
