On 13 Sep 2017 12:34 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 13 Sep 2017, at 13:06, David Nyman wrote: On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the >>> universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific >>> belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical) >>> beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent >>> provability to be a notion of knowledge. >>> >> >> This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because you >> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief). But this >> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example). >> > > Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge. > Gödel mention this already in 1933. > > > > It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it >> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ?? >> > > Ih he proves it (correctly or not). > But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven". Which is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief". I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in my last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality', can only be relative to a point of view. It's perfectly possibly that any such idiosyncratic, though unavoidable, commitment may deviate from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency and that this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the ineluctable logic of evolution. Nevertheless if something is true for me, in this primary or undoubtable sense, it will correspond with my (relative) reality, in both its formal or effective aspect (Bp) and its truthful or phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent interpretation based on such primary givens is of course a separate question. OK, but in the general context, explicitly assuming Mechanism (and thus Church's thesis, arithmetic, ...), "p" refer to the "absolute" arithmetical truth (or better at some point, the sigma_1 truth). Yes, I was trying to be (too) short, I guess. I hope you agree that elementary arithmetic is "absolutely true". Just slightly more doubtable than consciousness! Yes indeed, for our purposes here. It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls) our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such judgments are lacking in *truth*. Which is close to nonsense to me, because he use the word "transcend" like if observation could lead correctly to such judgment. he is very coherent in his materialism, and he is force to eliminate consciousness in that process. But that is close to the mechanist reduction ad absurdum, because consciousness existence, although not out there, is still existing in here. Yes I agree, but then although he is, as you say, forced by prior commitment to deny any distinct reality to consciousness, he persists (deliberately and with polemical purpose, I'm convinced) in using ambiguous terms like 'illusory'. This terminology easily misleads because we all think we know what is meant by an illusion. Trouble is, every other illusion we can bring to mind is in fact a veridical perception, misinterpreted, and this bleeds into his idiosyncratic use of the same term to characterise consciousness. I think he takes advantage of this ambiguity in bullying his less wary readers into a sort of confused acquiescence. It's a bit like the distinction that's often missed (e.g. in some of my discussions with Brent) between the primary undoubtability of perceptual phenomena and their subsequent interpretation. It's the latter, not the former, that is basically the origin of the notion of the illusory. I've even seen this misattribution quoted as a rebuttal of Descartes' cogito, as though he had been claiming that he couldn't be mistaken in *what* he was experiencing as distinct from *that* he was experiencing. But that very distinction was always his precise point. Actually, if we really put the "p" (alone) in consciousness, we get the unnameable cosmic consciousness of the zeroth person view (but here we are in G* minus G, and so I am blaspheming again). Blasphemy apart, I accept that we will ultimately require the Dt nuance to split the cosmic consciousness into the multiple first person views of the generic or digital knower (this is beginning to sound like a mechanistic credo!). So those views will then turn out to rely for their consistency on a phenomenal physics whose computational dual will ultimately correspond with (i.e. emulate) their effective beliefs in or, in my words, commitments to, that selfsame phenomenal reality. David Bruno David Brent Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We > just cannot know an undecidable (by us) proposition, by definition, > although we can bet on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge > (closer to Bp & Dt). > That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream > argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into > disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did. > > Bruno > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
