On 9/13/2017 4:06 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the
existence of the universal number(s), then I define a
notion of rational belief "scientific belief",
(Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1
arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a
notion of knowledge.
This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it;
because you want knowledge to be true belief (not just
true provable belief). But this does violence to the
usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example).
Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.
It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us
can assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us
will know it. ??
Ih he proves it (correctly or not).
But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true
belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven". Which
is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief".
I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in my
last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality', can
only be relative to a point of view.
That's the very antithesis of the usual understanding of "reality". As
my later friend Vic Stenger put it, reality is what is point of view
invariant. That's why we replicate experiments - to make sure we're not
fooling ourselves.
It's perfectly possibly that any such idiosyncratic, though
unavoidable, commitment
What committment? Your committment to the idea that, 'correspondence
with a reality', can only be relative to a point of view?
may deviate from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency
Are you defining reality as a "consistency"? Are your provable beliefs
not consistent?
and that this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the ineluctable
logic of evolution. Nevertheless if something is true for me, in this
primary or undoubtable sense, it will correspond with my (relative)
reality,
Are your beliefs undoubtable? This whole paragraph makes no sense to
me. What does it mean, "true for me" and "relative reality"?
in both its formal or effective aspect (Bp) and its truthful or
phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent interpretation based on such
primary givens is of course a separate question.
It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim
about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that
there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls)
our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that
transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such
judgments are lacking in *truth*.
I've read several of Dennett's books and I've always found him to take
the correspondence theory of truth. Can you cite where he says there is
no reality?
Brent
David
Brent
Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable
(~Bp). We just cannot know an undecidable (by us)
proposition, by definition, although we can bet on it, but
then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the
dream argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are
forced into disbelieving the existence of consciousness in
dreams, as he did.
Bruno
Brent
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