On 9/13/2017 4:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2017, at 13:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the
existence of the universal number(s), then I define a
notion of rational belief "scientific belief",
(Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1
arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a
notion of knowledge.
This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do
it; because you want knowledge to be true belief (not
just true provable belief). But this does violence to
the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example).
Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.
It means that given some undecidable proposition one of
us can assert it and the other deny it, and then one of
us will know it. ??
Ih he proves it (correctly or not).
But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true
belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven".
Which is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief".
I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in
my last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality',
can only be relative to a point of view. It's perfectly possibly that
any such idiosyncratic, though unavoidable, commitment may deviate
from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency and that
this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the ineluctable logic of
evolution. Nevertheless if something is true for me, in this primary
or undoubtable sense, it will correspond with my (relative) reality,
in both its formal or effective aspect (Bp) and its truthful or
phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent interpretation based on such
primary givens is of course a separate question.
OK, but in the general context, explicitly assuming Mechanism (and
thus Church's thesis, arithmetic, ...), "p" refer to the "absolute"
arithmetical truth (or better at some point, the sigma_1 truth).
I hope you agree that elementary arithmetic is "absolutely true". Just
slightly more doubtable than consciousness!
It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim
about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that
there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls)
our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that
transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such
judgments are lacking in *truth*.
Which is close to nonsense to me, because he use the word "transcend"
like if observation could lead correctly to such judgment. he is very
coherent in his materialism, and he is force to eliminate
consciousness in that process.
He doesn't eliminate consciousness, he says it is the conclusion of
competition between modules of the brain constructing narratives to
explain perceptions.
Brent
But that is close to the mechanist reduction ad absurdum, because
consciousness existence, although not out there, is still existing in
here. Actually, if we really put the "p" (alone) in consciousness, we
get the unnameable cosmic consciousness of the zeroth person view (but
here we are in G* minus G, and so I am blaspheming again).
Bruno
David
Brent
Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable
(~Bp). We just cannot know an undecidable (by us)
proposition, by definition, although we can bet on it, but
then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the
dream argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are
forced into disbelieving the existence of consciousness in
dreams, as he did.
Bruno
Brent
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