On 14 Sep 2017 4:47 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/13/2017 4:06 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the >>> universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific >>> belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical) >>> beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent >>> provability to be a notion of knowledge. >>> >> >> This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because you >> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief). But this >> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example). >> > > Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge. > Gödel mention this already in 1933. > > > > It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it >> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ?? >> > > Ih he proves it (correctly or not). > But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven". Which is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief". I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in my last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality', can only be relative to a point of view. That's the very antithesis of the usual understanding of "reality". As my later friend Vic Stenger put it, reality is what is point of view invariant. That's why we replicate experiments - to make sure we're not fooling ourselves. Again, I'm afraid you're conflating the notion of truth as the result of an extended process of verification and checking, with that of the primary undoubtability of phenomenonal evidence. It's the latter we were discussing here, unless your intention is just to change the subject. If you need a criterion to distinguish the two concepts, just ask yourself if there is any characteristic of a given situation that is beyond doubt. If you can answer in the affirmative you have identified the truth in question. It's perfectly possibly that any such idiosyncratic, though unavoidable, commitment What committment? Your committment to the idea that, 'correspondence with a reality', can only be relative to a point of view? I'm not sure it's entirely helpful to interpolate questions in the middle of sentences. But, as I hope might have been clearer in the light of the whole, the notion of belief here, as I am trying to clarify, is more akin to a commitment rather than a hope, so to speak. IOW, if I 'believe' in the sense of Bp I am willy-nilly committed to the implied (relative) truth associated with that commitment. The general idea, which it was my intention to discuss, is that the comp theory leads to the speculation that such beliefs/commitments and their corresponding truths/realities are what ultimately ramify into full-blown physical/phenomenal viewpoints. The general rationale here is that since all of the necessary logic is emulable by the 'universal machine' it will consequently will be so emulated and hence form part of the spectrum of selectable computations. may deviate from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency Are you defining reality as a "consistency"? Are your provable beliefs not consistent? No, I'm saying that erroneous beliefs or commitments, as outlined above, may be nested within ones that are more generally consistent with a wider environmental perspective. This is in fact the corrective to erroneous belief provided by an evolutionary logic and it is thereby both indispensable and hazardous to each individual which, willy-nilly, must place 'bets' on its own idiosyncratic version of reality. and that this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the ineluctable logic of evolution. Nevertheless if something is true for me, in this primary or undoubtable sense, it will correspond with my (relative) reality, Are your beliefs undoubtable? In the primary sense I've explained. More than once actually. What is so hard to grasp about this distinction? This whole paragraph makes no sense to me. What does it mean, "true for me" and "relative reality"? My personal phenomenonal reality of course. What else are we discussing? in both its formal or effective aspect (Bp) and its truthful or phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent interpretation based on such primary givens is of course a separate question. It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls) our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such judgments are lacking in *truth*. I've read several of Dennett's books and I've always found him to take the correspondence theory of truth. Can you cite where he says there is no reality? I said no reality that transcends the judgements themselves. Dennett argues repeatedly that the intuition that there is anything beyond our 'judgements about' conscious phenomena is illusory. Hence it follows in this view that the claim that any such judgment corresponds to an additional fact, or IOW to a phenomenal reality, is false. When you state the thing this badly of course it sounds like the nonsense it is, but that's hardly my fault. David Brent David Brent Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We > just cannot know an undecidable (by us) proposition, by definition, > although we can bet on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge > (closer to Bp & Dt). > That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream > argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into > disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did. > > Bruno > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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