On 15 Nov 2017, at 01:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/11/2017 12:44 am, smitra wrote:
On 14-11-2017 09:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 14/11/2017 5:51 pm, smitra wrote:

Within this model, Bob does not decohere until that time he is told what Alice has found.

That is simply not true. Decoherence is not subject to a particular
person's knowledge. When Alice and Bob are next to each other, they
are jointly entangled with a particular result.

I think that this needs to be discussed in more detail. Decoherence does not cause a superposition to get reduced to either one of the two possible outcomes. Given what Bob knows, he cannot locate himself in either sector. If this were not true then given everything Bob is aware of, he could get to better odds than 50-50 for guessing the spin. But that implies information transfer to something his brain can access.

One of the strongest arguments for MWI was that it eliminates the concept of a conscious observer from the interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is seen to be particularly important in quantum cosmology, but it is relevant everywhere. You seem to be wanting to turn the clock back and make consciousness, and conscious knowledge of events, central to your interpretation.

The branches form under decoherence for every quantum event. Whether you know about it or not, or know the result of the experiment, is irrelevant. Schrödinger's cat is definitely dead in one branch, and definitely alive in the other, whether you open the box or not.

That is MWI in standard QM. If you want to propose another theory in which consciousness is central, then that is up to you. But you have to show that your alternative theory reproduces all the observed results of quantum mechanics before you can say that you are right and everyone else is wrong.


Everett use the theory of Mechanism for consciousness, and yes, that is the main reason to prefer MWI than an hardly intelligible action of consciousness on matter, but I think Saibal was using only the usual first person/third person distinction, that Mechanism implied (if I got his point).

Bruno




So, it boils down to decoherence acting on a microscopic degrees of freedom, while brains and computers must be robust systems that would not function well if they would be affected by such effects. Thermal noise would make computing impossible.

If you have robust bitstrings that are only going to be affected by information present in the environment at a sufficiently coarse grained level, then that bitstring is never going to pick up any information about Alice's result other than via direct communication or any leakage of information e.g. if Bob is in to cold reading, or if there are other correlations at the macroscopic level that Bob can exploit.

So, we have two decohered parallel worlds, but Bob is mentally identical in the two sectors despite decoherence having split his body. As long as he cannot access that information, he is the same person in both sectors.

And the rock on the ground outside the laboratory is the same in both decohered worlds. That is irrelevant to the existence of such worlds in MWI. As I said, Bob's knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant to the fact that locality implies there are worlds in which angular momentum is not conserved in the scenario that I have outlined.

Bruce

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