There is also the UCH, Universal Computational Hypothesis, of Tegmark that posits all possible Turing computable functions play a role in physics. It is a bit of a step down from the Universal Mathematical Hypothesis meant to avoid issues of Godel's theorem. In physics the term computational means the view the universe is mapped into models of computation.
LC On Thursday, December 28, 2017 at 8:39:47 AM UTC-6, telmo_menezes wrote: > > Hi Lawrence, > > In the context of this mailing list, computationalism usually refers > to the Computational Theory of Mind. People also talk about comp, > usually referring to the work of Bruno Marchal. These things have been > extensively discussed for many years here, including their > falsifiability -- not always in the most polite fashion :) > > Cheers, > Telmo. > > On Wed, Dec 27, 2017 at 10:29 PM, Lawrence Crowell > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > Computationalism is not something that is falsified any more than the > > mathematics employed in a theory are falsifiable. Computationalism is > just > > the statement that certain physical processes are computations. Feynman > > diagrams describing the interactions of elementary particles involve > > particles exchanging each other according to Lie algebraic roots. In a > sense > > this is a sort of computation. The physics is then modeled as a type of > > computation. There is nothing empirically testable about using this as a > > model idea. We can show that a particular computational model is false, > but > > the idea that computation as a systematic approach to modeling is not > > testable. > > > > LC > > > > > > On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 1:18:30 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > >> > >> Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known > to > >> date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been > falsified > >> so far. I was hoping with this post to gather a complete list of those > >> tests. What things in physics would disprove computationalism, and > what > >> tests has it passed so far? Below I try to collect a complete list > from > >> memory but it may be faulty. I ask that others might add to this list > or > >> correct things I have gotten wrong: > >> > >> Tests and statuses of each test: > >> > >> Non-emulability of physical laws > >> > >> Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat > confirmed) > >> Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly > >> confirmed) > >> > >> Quantum Mechanics > >> > >> Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete > knowledge > >> about environment) --- (confirmed) > >> Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed, explanation > for > >> being an "appearance only" i.e. first person indeterminancy vs. > fundamental > >> randomness is made is plausible) > >> Born Rule? > >> Quantization of Energy? > >> Unitarity > >> > >> General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by > computationalism, > >> and could use some more help on these) > >> > >> Linearity of physical laws? > >> Time reversibility? > >> Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox) > >> Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound) > >> Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle) > >> Existence of a "Time" dimension? > >> > >> Consciousness > >> > >> Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ? > >> Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of experience)? > >> > >> Are there other things I am missing? If any of the items I have > included > >> are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and further > insight. > >> > >> Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently > >> unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be > tested > >> and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed, yield > further > >> evidence for computationalism). > >> > >> Jason > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
