On 5 Jan 2018 19:27, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 4 Jan 2018, at 21:07, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>> Now, it > >>>> could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself > >>>> argue, we don't know that. > >>> > >>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There > seemed to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie > is impossible. > >> > >> > >> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume > Mechanism. > > > > But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is > impossible because it exhibits intelligent behavior. > > Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more > plausible than non-computationalism. > Computationalism makes zombies non sensical. > > > > > > >> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non > computationalist theory of mind. > > > > It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is > only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use > include as an axiom that computation produces mind. One can as say that > intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism. Logic is a > very cheap standard for theories to meet. > > At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the > notion of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies > (having the right behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never > associated to a body, but only to the person having the infinity of > (similar enough) bodies relative representation in arithmetic. There are no > “real bodies” or “ontological bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes > senseless. The consciousness is associated with the person, which is never > determined by one body. > So in the light of what you say above, does it then follow that the MGA implies (assuming comp) that a physical system does *not* in fact implement a computation in the relevant sense? The physical world has to be able to implement the computation in the relevant (Turing-Church-Post-Kleene CT) sense. You need this for the YD “act of faith. The physical world is a persistent illusion. It has to be enough persistent that you wake up at the hospital with the digital brain. I ask this because you say mind is *never* associated with a body, but mind *is* associated with computation via the epistemic consequences of universality. A (conscious) third person can associate a mind/person to a body that he perceives. It is polite. The body perceived by that third person is itself a construction of its own mind, and with computationalism (but also with QM), we know that such a body is an (evolving) map of where, and in which states, we could find, sy, the electron and proton of that body, and such snapshot is only a computational state among infinitely many others which would works as well, with respect to the relevant computations which brought its conscious state. Now, the conscious first person cannot associate itself to any particular body or computation. Careful: sometimes I say that a machine can think, or maybe (I usually avoid) that a computation can think or be conscious. It always mean, respectively, that a machine can make a person capable of manifesting itself relatively to you. But the machine and the body are local relative representation. A machine cannot think, and a computation (which is the (arithmetical) dynamic 3p view of the sequence of the relative static machine/state) cannot think. Only a (first) person can think, and to use that thinking with respect to another person, a machine is handy, like brain or a physical computer. The person is in heaven (arithmetical truth) and on earth (sigma_1 arithmetical truth), simultaneously. But this belongs to G*, and I should stay mute, or insist that we are in the “after-act-of-faith” position of the one betting that comp is true, and … assuming comp is true. It is subtle to talk on those things, and it is important to admit that we don’t know the truth (or we do get inconsistent and fall in the theological trap). If so, according to comp, it would follow that (the material appearance and behaviour of) a body cannot be considered *causally* relevant to the computation-mind polarity, Yes, that is true, with respect to the arithmetical truth (where there is no bodies, only natural numbers), and false for the physical realm, which, despite being a statistics on dreams (associated to computations in arithmetic) but instead must be regarded as a consistent *consequence* of it. Again that is correct in the 0th person view, but incorrect in the physical phenomenal view (1p-plural). With respect to me, your brain makes the relevant computations. We do share the most of our computations, and that is because the arithmetical multiplication of the “bodies”, or “Gödel numbers”, arithmetical relative computations have or should the right measure (which remains to be continuously verified. The arithmetico-logical entailment is like NUMBER ==> CONSCIOUSNESS ==> PHYSICS ==> HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS So, again with respect to the MGA, under the original assumption of physicalism, we are to conclude that the filmed graph scenario cannot be associated with a conscious state because the necessary computations are not implemented. The consciousness is associated to the “abstract logical relations” which defines the computations, in term of numbers, or physical objects (which will be given by infinities of numbers and computational relations). But I thought that the point of the first part of the MGA, initially assuming physicalism, in which the broken logic gates are 'fixed' only by the intervention of the filmed graph, was supposed to show that *no* relevant computations were being implemented in that scenario. And that consequently any association with this state of affairs and consciousness would be absurd. Isn't that correct? What you say above seems more consistent with the situation *after* the assumption of a 'reversal' of the relation between physics and machine psychology, in that we are then always dealing, ex hypothesi, with what is ultimately computation in one form or another. Am I wrong? Also, I'm still unclear whether, after the demonstration that the original MGA scenario does not implement a computation or any association with a conscious state, the reversal is supposed to convince us that the opposite is now the case. Sorry for the confusion. Now “a physical computation”, like anyone done by any universal numbers, do make possible to the consciousness to manifest itself, The physical must start from the statistic on all computations.Yet, endemically, it always look like once computation above the substitution level. If so, what difference does it make if one abandons the assumption of physicalism in this case and assumes comp? Are we then to suppose that the filmed graph now implements a computation and hence is now associated with a conscious state? If not, what difference is the reversal supposed to have made to the situation? The difference is that with comp, if you want to keep physicalism, you need to define precisely what you mean by the primary matter, like saying it is irreducible particles, or strings, say, and you need to explain what is not Turing emulable in their 3p behaviour, and why that select the computations in the universal deployment (alias the sigma_1 complete arithmetical reality). If this is the case, then why is the conclusion of the MGA, continuing to assume physicalism (although I understand the arguments for not doing so you cite above), that the broken logic gates + the filmed graph don't implement a computation? The MGA shows you need magic to keep comp and the idea that there is an inrreductible physical dream. With comp, physics is the mode of the self-reference which “arithmetically guaranty” *some* reality ([]p & <>t). []p & <>t gives the measure one. Think about the WM-duplication thought experiment. You are guarantied (modulo the act of faith) that in all relative continuations you will have a cup of coffee. That is []p with p “I will be offered a cup of coffee”. But []p -> p, nor the existence of a reality, <>t, can be guarantied (except by the big Truth), so to have a notion of bet which attach the rational relative quasi certainty ([]p) to the consistency (<>t), G* shows that it does not change the (arithmetical) reality that you can apprehend, but it changes the modes of apprehension, which are the nuances between p, []p, []p & p, []p & <>t, etc. Physicalism relies, could we say, with two important assumptions: 1) that one universal number U is more important than all the other, like perhaps a quantum dovetailer, *and* 2) that it is irreductible, or not explainable, or justifiable from something else. But with computationalism, the only way to satisfy 1) is that the “winner” U must be determined by the measure one on the computational continuations as seen by the average person supported by the (many) universal numbers implementing it. You can see a universal machine/number as a system of reference for the sequence of partial computable function phi_i. It is like a base in physics. Once a system is used, all systems get associated with a number. Physicalism believe a special computational base is in play, but with computationalism, if that is true, it has to be justifiable from the universal machine logical self-reference ability, or we introduce some magic. UDA was initially UDP (Universal Dovetailer Paradox). It is as much a problem than an argument. It shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult with computationalism, as it is partially transformed into the obligation of reducing the “observable” in term of universal machine self-reference ability (and then incompleteness provides the nuances needed to do that in the manner of the greeks). MGA is for those who keep materialism and computationalism, and it shows that if primary matter plays a role, the role is magical, and isomorphic to the bad use of the “big one” in metaphysics. An invention to hide a question. Very useful when you don’t have the time to work on the fundamental perhaps, certainly a resting position leading to focusing on the measurable numbers and make big discoveries, but at the metaphysical level, it simply needs to invoke magic, where computationlism needs to invoke only the logical transcendence of truth (about a machine, by that machine or the person supported by it). Perhaps I need to have the MGA broken down step by step again. I thought the first part of the argument was a reductio against the possibility of a primitively physical device in the state as described being capable of implementing a computation, and hence by implication any conscious state. I understand your argument against the 'magical' selection of a particular class of Turing emulable computations, in the absence of any evidence that anything other than Turing emulability is required. But this seems somehow a separate issue from the reductio argument itself. What am I missing? David If []p & <>t did not provide the quantisation ([]<>p) needed, and the main modal quantum principles ([]p ->p, p -> []<>p), I would less sure that the evidences are in favour of computationalism. Anyway, we should pursue the comparison (between the physics in the head of the machine and the actual observations and possible ways to interpret them. Feel free to ask any question, I am aware that is is not easy, I am helped by the Solovay theorems which provides two mathematical tools (G and G*) to disambiguate the self-referential modes. Bruno David To have a mind as sophisticated as the human, you need a long story, and a deep story actually, in the sense of Bennet, but it has to be multilinear (and reversible at the bottom, apparently). Each hypostases has its own opinion on consciousness. For Bp it is mere consistency (true but non provable), for Bp & p, it is obvious, for example. For human bodies, it is difficult, because bodies are both illusion an what makes the illusion able to persist, notably in the first person plural way. Bruno David > > > > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> Of course that doesn't mean it's true. But it seems as good a working > hypothesis as "Yes, doctor". And in fact it's the working hypothesis of > most studies of neurocognition, intelligence, and mind. > >> > >> Neuroscience and AI often bet, more or less explicitly, on mechanism, > or on its "strong AI" weakenings. > >> > >> (Note that UDA use mechanism, but its translation in arithmetic needs > only strong-AI. Note that if strong AI is true, and comp false, we get > infinitely many zombies in arithmetic. > > > > How do you know that? > > > I was wrong. Wrote to quickly. It is only if weak AI is true, and strong > AI or comp false, that there will be infinitely many zombies in arithmetic. > Of course, if strong AI is false, comp is false too. > > > > > > > > >> very curious one, which lacks body and mind, but act like you and me. > They are quite similar with the "Bohm's zombies", the beings in the > branches of the universal quantum wave which have no particles. > >> > >> > >>> If it's true then it provides a link from intelligent behavior to mind. > >> > >> The "non-zombie" principle is a consequence of comp, but I doubt that > it implies comp. It is not related to finiteness, as comp and strong AI are. > >> > >> > >> > >>> We already have links from from physics to brain to intelligent > behavior. So why isn't this the physics based theory of mind that Bruno et > al keep saying is impossible? > >> > >> This is a bit ambiguous and misleading. Comp makes physics necessary, > and that is why with Occam, physics cannot be assumed primitively if we > want to use actual physics to verify or refute comp. > > > > That very much depends on what physics comp makes necessary. > > Well, if it violate our empirical physics, comp is refuted. > > > > > > >> We can of course assume physics when doing physics, but not when doing > computationalist theory of mind. > > > > No, but we can assume physics when doing physicalist theory of mind. > > Yes, but then the point is that a physicalist theory of mind (like with > consciousness reducing the wave) will be non-computationalist. > > > > > >> > >> OK? "physics" is necessary for machine/numbers is what makes the > physical assumption eliminable, and is what makes computationalism testable. > > > > But it doesn't seem to be testable because the conclusions drawn from it > are extremely general > > > Not at all. It is very precise mathematical theories (qZ1*, qX1*, qS4Grz1). > > > > > and already known > > No. They are totally unknown, even ignored. I bet, and many others bet, in > the eighties that this would be refuted before 2000. Some thought having > already refute it, but they assumed a theory which was already refuted by > incompleteness. Then we got the main confirmation in the nineties, but > still no contradiction with “nature". > > > > > and supported by other assumptions: e.g. linearity of QM, probabilistic > physics. It doesn't tell us why memories get less reliable when they are > more often recalled. > > That kind of things are expected to be understood through mechanism. > > > > It doesn't tell us why we have no memories of early childhood. It > doesn't tell us why Alzheimers causes loss of recent memories first. It > doesn't tell us whether spacetime derives from quantum entanglement. > > It tell us why there is an apparent physical reality, and where > consciousness comes from. Physics does not address the question, and > physicists aboard this at “reculons, like with the constant > des-anthropomorphization (Galilee, Einstein, Everett). > > Of course logicians/theologians and physicists should met at the middle of > the mind-body bridge. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Brent > > > > Brent > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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