On 5 January 2018 at 21:51, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 1/5/2018 6:48 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 5 January 2018 at 14:06, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Friday, January 5, 2018, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5 Jan 2018 03:22, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>> >>> On 4/01/2018 11:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 12:50 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 4/01/2018 12:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 29 Dec 2017, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/12/2017 10:14 am, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is computationalism - the idea that our human consciousness >>>>>>>> _is_ >>>>>>>> a computation (and nothing but a computation). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> What distinguishes a conscious computation within the class of all >>>>>>> computations? After all, not all computations are conscious. >>>>>>> >>>>>> Universality seems enough. >>>>>> >>>>> What is a universal computation? From what you say below, universality >>>>> appears to be a property of a machine, not of a computation. >>>>> >>>> OK, universality is an attribute of a machine, relatively to some >>>> universal machinery, like arithmetic or physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> But just universality gives rise only to a highly non standard, >>>>>> dissociative, form of consciousness. It might correspond to the cosmic >>>>>> consciousness alluded by people living highly altered state of >>>>>> consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> You need Löbianity to get *self-consciousness*, or reflexive >>>>>> consciousness. A machine is Löbian when its universality is knowable by >>>>>> it. >>>>>> Equivalently, when the machine is universal and can prove its own "Löb's >>>>>> formula". []([]p -> p) -> []p. Note that the second incompleteness >>>>>> theorem >>>>>> is the particular case with p = f (f = "0≠1"). >>>>>> >>>>> Löbanity is a property of the machine, not of the computation. >>>>> >>>> Yes. The same. I was talking about machine or about the person >>>> supported by those machine. No machine (as conceived as a code, number, >>>> physical object) can ever be conscious or think. It is always a more >>>> abstract notion implemented through some machinery which do the thinking. >>>> >>>> Similarly a computation cannot be conscious, but it can support a >>>> person, which is the one having genuinely the thinking or conscious >>>> attribute. >>>> >>> >>> The original suggestion by Russell was that "our human consciousness >>> _is_ a computation (and nothing but a computation)." >>> >>> You seem to be steering away from Russell's straightforward position. If >>> human consciousness is a computation, then the computation is conscious (it >>> is an identity thesis). You say that the computation cannot be conscious, >>> but can support a person. It is difficult to see this as anything other >>> than the introduction of a dualistic element: the computation supports a >>> conscious person, but is not itself conscious? So wherein does >>> consciousness exist? You are introducing some unspecified magic into the >>> equation. And what characterizes those computations that can support a >>> person from those that cannot? >>> >>> >>> Let me see if I can attempt some sort of answer Bruce. The utility of >>> the notion of the 'universal' mechanism is precisely its ability to emulate >>> all other finitely computable mechanisms. But not all such mechanisms can >>> be associated with persons. What distinguishes this particular class, as >>> exemplified by Bruno's modal logic toy models is, in the first instance, >>> self-referentiality. This first-personal characteristic is, if you like, >>> the fixed point on which every other feature is centred. Then, with respect >>> to this fixed point of view, a distinction can be made between what is >>> 'believed' (essentially, provably true as a theorem and hence communicable) >>> by the machine and what is true *about* the machine (essentially, not >>> provable as a theorem and hence not communicable, but nonetheless >>> 'epistemically' true). >>> >> >> >> Given the above, what would be the shortest program with these properties? >> >> Is the Mars Rover conscious? >> > > Don't forget that the acid test is Yes (or No) Doctor. So AFAICT the > only way to assess whether the Mars Rover is conscious would be against the > same criteria as for any other independent agent. With human persons, > assuming truthfulness and consistency, if for example you tell me that you > see an apple, and that by this you do not alternatively mean to say that > you have somehow indirectly figured out that your body and an apple are in > some third-person relation, I typically accept your statement as the > behavioural corollary of the epistemic truth to which you refer. > > > To take a more realistic example. > I do so love your appropriation of the terms 'real' and 'realistic' to your own theories. Suppose the rover says, "My battery is low." You might consult telemetry > and see that the rover the battery is indeed low. You would conclude that > the rover has some self-awareness. > > Suppose the rover says "I see an interesting rock formation 200 meters > away on a heading of 105deg." You as a rover engineer would consult > telemetry video and see a rock formation at that location, but not being a > geologist you might just defer to the rover's judgement and superior > instrumentation as to whether it was interesting. So you're attributing > internal judgements to the rover which are not communicable to > you...although they may be to someone else more familiar with geology and > how the rover's instruments work. > > Suppose the rover turns 360deg in place. You consult the telemetry and > see that the drive wheel on one side was not turning but is not working. > You query the rover and it replies, "I don't know why I turned around." > Then you infer that the rover has a subconscious. > > None of this requires any knowledge of whether the rover can prove > Goedel's theorem, can't know what machine it is, or knows Loeb's theorem. > Fine. I'm perfectly happy for you to propose a theory of mind that is, in the final analysis, entirely coterminous with intelligent behaviour. But it's not a counter-argument to computationalism or its counter-intuitive implications. Which is a pity because the real motive for my pitiful attempts at articulating what is a frankly incomplete understanding of the matter is in the anticipation of discovering convincing counter-arguments. I still have hopes. David PS By the way, I see that unfortunately in one of my other responses to you I typed irreducible instead of reducible (bloody tablet). You may well have already noticed and made the necessary adjustment, but if you haven't, it should be fairly obvious. > > > Brent > > > > I suppose, notwithstanding this, if I were a computationalist Doctor, I > might have some theory about the shortest program with the relevant > characteristics to be associated with epistemic phenomena of the relevant > sort. But I'm not and I don't, so please don't ask me to operate. > > David > > Jason >> >> >>> >>> Any machine possessing the foregoing features is in principle conscious, >>> in the sense of having implicit self-referential epistemic access to >>> non-communicable truths that are nonetheless entailed by its explicit and >>> communicable 'beliefs'. Of course it's a long step from the toy model to >>> the human person, but I think one can still discern the thread. The >>> machine's 'beliefs' can now be represented as communicable and explicit >>> third-person behaviour with respect to a 'physical' environment in which it >>> is embedded; however, associated with this behaviour there are true but >>> non-communicable epistemic phenomena to which the behaviour indirectly >>> refers (i.e. they are true *about* the machine). An example of this would >>> be any statement (or judgment, in the usual terminology of the field) you >>> might make about your own phenomenal experience, as in "I see an apple". In >>> behavioral terms, this statement or judgment is cashed out purely as >>> physical action (neurocognitive, neuromuscular, etc). In epistemic terms >>> however it cashes out as a truth (tautological and hence undoubtable) >>> that's implied by that same behaviour - in other words that it is in fact >>> the case that you really do see an apple. >>> >>> It's important to take into account that all the terms employed are >>> given precise technical sense in mathematical logic, emulable in >>> computation. Bruno's computational schema is an attempt (motivated by the >>> CTM) to derive physics, or rather its consistent appearance, from the more >>> general ontology of computability. Self-referential machines are central to >>> this attempt, and the epistemic consequences of their 'beliefs' are what >>> ultimately distinguish persons from the associated machine behaviour. Since >>> many machines implement, both behaviourally and 'truthfully' so to speak, >>> essentially the same person, over some 'fuzzy spectrum' of characteristics >>> and outcomes, it can consequently be said that persons so defined possess >>> many bodies. >>> >>> Does this help at all? >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruce >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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