On 1/14/2018 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/what-neuroscience-cannot-tell-us-about-ourselves
I understand those criticisms of Searle and they may be right. But
note that arithmetic and computation are nothing like experience
either and all the same criticisms apply to CTM;
Not really. At first sight it looks like that IF we can associate a
consciousness to a person supported by a computation, then we can
certainly (even more would you and Peter Jone say) associate that
consciousness with a material implementation of that computation.
And we can test that theory by messing with the material implementation
and observing the effect on mentation...and the answer is...It's confirmed!
But that is not true. And perhaps we need to be more cautious, and
repeat again that in no case (with our without matter) a consciousness
is associated, still less identical with, a computation.
Consciousness is a first person attribute. It is a mode of belief, and
actually a mode of belief which intersect with truth.
Consciousness is an instinctive/logical belief in a reality formally
connected to … some reality, or “model” of oneself.
That is poetic, but is it empirically true? I don't think consciousness
is a "mode of belief", unless you drastically stretch meaning of
"belief". And what does it mean "to intersect with truth"...if I
generate propositions at random they will, occasionally "intersect with
truth". I think instinctive belief in reality evolved long before
consciousness. Part of the problem is that "consciousness" is thrown
around as though it's meaning is obvious and no distinction is made
between awareness, self-awareness, inner-narrative, social-awareness, etc.
Brent
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