On Tuesday, February 13, 2018 at 11:33:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Lawrence, hi John,
> Sorry for the delay. I comment some answers in the same post.
> Lawrence, you say
> Hard emergence is either something really miraculous and thus not really
> in the domain of physics, or it is something we might call a miracle
> because we really do not understand it.
> So we agree. Ah, I see you did find an example. See below.
> John, you say
> > Bruno: You might try to give at least one example of hard emergence
> One molecule of water can't be wet but 6.02*10^ 23 molecules can be. And
> H2O at 31 degrees F has none of the properties of a liquid but at 33
> degrees F those same molecules have all the properties of a liquid;
> although usually emergent properties don't appear as suddenly as that, it
> is more smooth and continuous. Day is very different from night but there
> isn't an exact point where one turns into the other. There is nothing
> mysterious or miraculous going on its just that human language puts
> concepts into groups called "words" but the real world is messy so
> there are often intermediate cases where its not clear what the correct
> word should be; an 80 pound man is clearly thin and a 800 pound man is
> clearly fat but there are values between those extremes where reasonable
> people can differ on what the correct word should be.
> I don’t see the exemple of hard emergence.
> I think that “hard emergence” is a spurious concept like the one used to
> hide the mind-body problem. In that case it reflects at least the
> understanding that mind does not come out of the brain like wetness comes
> out from the many water molecules. In the second case we stay in the third
> person discourse, but in the first, we must explain a relationship between
> two types of points of view (and with mechanism, it cannot be a one-one
> relation, but a modality related to self-reference).
> It occurred to me a case of hard emergence. The outcome of a quantum
> measurement is such. I have iterated how I think this is connected to
> self-reference, ]
> Nice! Is it related to the self-duplication? With the MW formulation of
> QM,, and simplifying a little bit to avoid being too much technical, when
> you look at schroedinger cat, you duplicate yourself, as the duplication of
> the cat is linearly inherited by you when observing the cat, and is, in
> relevance with computationalism, an example of self-duplication. A
> classical self-duplication, via artificial brain or bi-teleportation gives
> the same “miracle”, or 1p-account of “miracle”. Of course there is no
> miracle at all, and then “hard emergence” is again relegate to the “hard
> problem” of relating first person experience and third person description
> (see my paper to get the point that with Mechanism, this cannot be
> … [so I will not repeat that here. However, the outcome is completely
> random and has no causal basis. ]...
> I agree that the outcome is completely random, but the randomness itself
> as a causal base: the numerical identity of the “copies” in front of
> different inputs. That exists a lot in arithmetic which emulates all
> computations with a non trivial redundancy. That happens in the biological
> reality too, in many variate ways.
> … It emerges for no particular reason, such as initial conditions, and is
> as I see it a complete hard emergence.
> It is hard in the 3p sense that it is absolutely indeterminate. Exactly
> like in the case of the amoeba, or the digital duplication of oneself made
> possible in the Digital Mechanist frame and/or in Arithmetic.
> That is not "hard emergence", it is rather simple to explain by our first
> person indeterminacy, that is the fact that a universal machine cannot know
> which computations support them.
> “Hard emergence” would be like adding the conscious attribute of a person
> “living” that randomness, but then “hard” just refers to the hardness of
> the mind-body problem.
You have pretty well captured what I was trying to illuminate here. I think
there may well be hard emergence. Quantum collapse as a phenomenology is a
case where in order to understand it, or to encode it, we would need to be
able to data compress a vast number of sequences of such measurements. You
can be sure this will not compress much, and the Chaitan halting
probability would be low. This means in effect Kolmogoroff entropy or
complexity has no complete computable measure. Fundamentally randomness is
not defined by a computing system.
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