> On 19 Feb 2018, at 13:13, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>
> On Monday, February 19, 2018 at 5:46:16 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 18 Feb 2018, at 21:38, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com
>> On Sunday, February 18, 2018 at 9:57:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 10 Feb 2018, at 14:29, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com <>>
>>> On Friday, February 9, 2018 at 8:05:09 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>>> On Friday, February 9, 2018 at 5:58:04 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>> It occurred to me a case of hard emergence. The outcome of a quantum
>>> measurement is such. I have iterated how I think this is connected to
>>> self-reference, so I will not repeat that here.
>>> It would be useful IMO, if you did just that. How can random measurement
>>> results be connected with "self referential", whatever that means? A good
>>> idea, sometimes even a bad one, is worth repeating for evaluation. AG
>>> I have outlined on this forum how a quantum measurement is really where
>>> quantum states measure quantum states. This is then self-referential and
>>> the odd properties of quantum measurement may then be due to the emergence
>>> or occurrence of principles outside of causal principles of quantum
>> It has to be like that if we assume mechanics, and indeed we recover quantum
>> logic at the place we expect a logic for the first person plural observable
>> of the machine. Physics can no more be the fundamental science, it becomes a
>> branch of computer science, or better, of the “theology of number” (itself a
>> branch of pure number theory).
>> Or as a quote from a person named Butterfield I read earlier today is
>> paraphrased as "Mathematics is the syntax of the world, while physics is the
>> semantics of it.”
> That is rather misleading, given than in mathematical logic we keep well the
> distinction between syntax (the theories, proofs, …), and the semantics
> (usually infinite non syntactical mathematical object). The physical reality
> can be seen as a semantics of a physical theory, but physics cannot be seen
> as a semantic for many other mathematical theories. Then with mechanism,
> there is no physical universe at the ontological level. It is a
> phenomenological first person plural reality.
> That Butterfield remarks will add to the confusion of many between a theory
> and a semantic in mathematics. It looks like the older conventionalist view
> of mathematics, which does no more make sense since Gödel (Imo), and even
> less with Mechanism (the ultimate reaiity becomes any models (in the logician
> sense) of arithmetic or of any Turing complete theory).
> Consider Newton's second law F = ma. The right hand side of this equation
> consists of the mass m that is a kinematic quantity. The acceleration a =
> dv/dt = d^2x/dt^2 is a geometric and kinematic quantity. On the left the
> force F is a dynamical quantity. This is an elementary form of what Einstein
> commented on with his field theory "spacetime curvature = matter dynamics,"
> where he called the left hand side gold and the right hand side wood. What we
> do is to interpret these formula, which in some sense is semantics. Nature
> gives us not so much the formula for interpreting how the LHS and RHS are
> equal, but rather we impose that on nature.
OK. We do semantics when doing applied physics, but we do that in mathematics
too, where it is also quite important to distinguish the theories and the
interpretation of the theories. Indeed logic provides tools so that the theorem
remains true in all interpretations (completeness theorem, when possible).
This is made more problematical by the fact that logicians use the term models
for “semantics” and the term “theory” for the machine, syntax or even the
observer, but physicists use “models” for theories.
Then with mechanism, it can be shown that we cannot assume physics. To get the
mind-body relation right, we have to explain the physical without physical
assumptions. I don’t expect you to understand this without studying my papers
(to be franc: it is not obvious at all).
>> There is an open question on Lob's theorem, where this has a modal
>> construction called semantic soundness.
>> In the case of state reduction or why we observe certain outcomes we might
>> just be faced with this as a hard emergence that has no causal or prior
>> reason for being. There is no derived reason for it, but it just is.
> Then it is like the (classical) first person indeterminacy. You are read and
> cut in Helsinki, and reconstitute in Sidney and Beijing: the 1p-ouctome of
> that experience is indeterminate, even for God. But I would not say it has no
> reason or no cause: on the contrary, it is because everything is 3p
> determinate that the 1p is absolutely not determinate.
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