> On 1 Mar 2018, at 21:37, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 3/1/2018 2:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 1 Mar 2018, at 00:19, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/28/2018 7:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 26 Feb 2018, at 19:09, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/26/2018 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 23 Feb 2018, at 20:37, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2/23/2018 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 22 Feb 2018, at 23:17, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>>>>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> no doubt because they believe that their own consciousness is important >>>>>>> in their intelligent behavior. Sure it's possible that they are >>>>>>> unrelated and it's just a coincidence or the consciousness is an otiose >>>>>>> epiphenomenon. But that doesn't mean it's not evidence...and pretty >>>>>>> convincing evidence at that. You have become so immersed in logic and >>>>>>> mathematics that you seem to have forgotten that science doesn't find >>>>>>> *necessary* truths and that acting on evidence is not an act of faith >>>>>>> but of reason. >>>>>> >>>>>> When you based your act on reason, you still need some faith in your >>>>>> reason and in its applicability to your local reality. >>>>> >>>>> A sophistic argument worthy of a theologian. If you didn't have "faith" >>>>> in your reason you'd have no basis for any belief or action. It's just a >>>>> rhetorical trick to insert "faith”. >>>> >>>> Not in theology or metaphysics. >>>> >>>> You could say that once we believe in the truth of some axioms, we >>>> automatically believe in the consistency of the axioms. >>> >>> A mathematicians answer. Physical theories that are effectively equivalent >>> may derive from different axioms. >> >> >> Exactly like in mathematics. Or like in computer science. All what I explain >> here are theorem of elementary arithmetic, but also of combinatory theory, >> using only the two equations >> >> Kxy = x >> Sxyz = xz(yz) >> >> Without adding anything, except for the Mechanist motivation in the >> background. >> >> Mathematical logic study exactly that: the relation between truth, >> consistency, provability or their combinations. Incompleteness makes all >> those notions quite different. >> >> Alas, many non mathematicians confuse the theories with their intended >> models/realities. > > How do you define truth if not in terms of their models?

## Advertising

Truth, in mathematical logic, can be defined only trough a notion of model. In arithmetic, truth refers usually to the standard, model, which is given by the set N = {0, 1, 2, …}, and s is interpreted by the function from N to N sending x on x+1, and likewise for the interpretation on the + and * symbol. RA (Q), and PA are first order theory, so: Provable in PA (RA) = true in all models of PA (RA). Consistent with PA (RA) = true in at least one model of PA (RA). Truth (in the standard model) cannot be defined, but the theories can approximated them by being able to define the notion of sigma_n truth for each n. We can define arithmetical truth in stronger theories, like set theory or analysis, but with mechanism those will be conceived as mind tools by universal numbers/machines. But the theories does not assume truth, nor even the notion of truth. They assume axioms and rules of inference. We can identifie finite-being, number, digital machines, programs, words, etc. Eventually we work in an applicative algebra(N, #) where n # m = phi_n(m), for a recursive enumeration of the digital being in a Turing universal system. The models are locally bypassed by the notion of the collection of “universal system” running the computations which supports myself. > >> >> >> >> >>> So physicists place less credence in the axioms than in the theory. >> >> The axioms (+rules, if formal) constitute the theory. > > Maxwell's equations plus values of permitivity, permeability, and currents > constitute the theory. But they're not a set of axioms because they are not > closed; their application depends on boundary conditions. OK. > >> >> >> >> >>> The physicist is interested which, of many possible, axioms produce a >>> theory that agrees with observation and makes successful predictons. >>> Feynman characterized this as Persian vs Greek mathematics. >> >> Why would be theology, in the greek sense, be different? Theology, in the >> original sense of Plato, just means “theory of everything”, > > No, the original, Greek sense, was observation and speculation: Yes. The observation, followed on the speculation, which is the theorisation. All theories are speculation, more or less confirmed. The greek were just aware that was the case in theology too, which by definition for them (simplifying the things for avoiding inevitable nuances), study God, the Ultimate Truth, with the understanding/bet that it is something beyond us. > > theory: From Middle French théorie, from Late Latin theōria, from Ancient > Greek θεωρία (theōría, “contemplation, speculation, a looking at, things > looked at”), from θεωρέω (theōréō, “I look at, view, consider, examine”), > from θεωρός (theōrós, “spectator”), from θέα (théa, “a view”) + ὁράω (horáō, > “I see,look”). > > theology: From Middle English theologie, from Middle French theologie, from > Old French theologie, from Latin theologia, from Koine Greek θεολογία > (theología), from θεολόγος (theológos, adjective), from θεός (theós) + λόγος > (lógos). > > "Theory" and "theology" don't even have the same root in Greek; theoros vs > theos. I thing theories and these have themselves a common root. But all this is beyond the point. With computationalism, physicalism makes an assumption without evidence which makes the mind-body problem unsolvable. > >> and that includes both mind and matter. It is verifiable, even if today we >> are just at the beginning. I derive most of the quantum logic and weirdness >> (the many-histories) from Indexical Computationalism. I was not taken >> seriously because at that time Everett was not well known, and even quantum >> logic was dismissed (but this has changed since). >> >> >> >>> >>>> And you would be correct. Yet, the theory made with this axiom + the >>>> consistency of those axioms is much more rich. It proves much more >>>> theorem. >>>> That comes from incompleteness and is extremely counter-intuitive, so we >>>> have to be careful. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> This does not need to be mentioned in most practical application of >>>>>> science, but it becomes important when doing metaphysics or theology >>>>>> with the scientific method. >>>> >>>> … like I just say. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplant >>>>>>>>>> experience oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despite >>>>>>>>>> the feeling). You can know that you have survived, but you cannot >>>>>>>>>> know for sure that you have survived integrally (but you can know >>>>>>>>>> that in the Theoretical sense, slightly weakened). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that science >>>>>>>>>> has proven we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Not at all. He may be going on the best available evidence. Just >>>>>>>>> because it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it has >>>>>>>>> no credence. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course. Computationalism just insist that in all case, it asks for >>>>>>>> the act of faith. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If it's based on all the evidence it ain't faith. "Faith is believing >>>>>>> what you know ain't so."...Mark Twain. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> No, that is blind faith. I use faith for acting from evidence, given >>>>>> that evidence proofs nothing. >>>>> >>>>> Depends on what you mean by "proof", we sentence people to prison based >>>>> on proof of their crime. >>>> >>>> >>>> In this case “proof” means evidence. Since the beginning I use “proof” in >>>> the sense of a rational justification from some set of primitive beliefs. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Not all proof is mathematical. And mathematical proof is only relative >>>>> to the axioms. >>>> >>>> Yes, that is why, even in mathematics, you need some faith. >>> >>> You mean especially in mathematics you rely entirely on faith. >> >> Well, less than in metaphysics. Materialist metaphysics speculates on >> something totally undetectable, and on an identity brain-mind link which >> contradict Mechanism. In mathematics the faith is in self-consistency and >> the reason of the others. >> >> >> >>> Mathematicians don't look for reasons for their axioms to be true, >> >> What??? >> You confuse mathematics and formalism. That is the old positivism in math >> totally abandoned today, for good reason. You confuse the means (theories) >> and the reality (the mathematical reality). >> >> >> >>> all they are interested in is what theorems follow from them. They don't >>> care if the axioms are true, they are hypotheticals. >> >> That is true for the object of study of the logicians, but there too, the >> logicians makes informal theories about that, and expect them to be true, >> like any mathematicians. A group theorist study some groups, and its >> theories are only tools. A logician study some formal system, and make >> (meta)-theories which he expect to be true, and he is interested in those >> truth. >> >> >> >>> You're trying to interpret "true" and "false" in mathematics as though they >>> meant the same as true and false in normal discourse. >> >> Yes, they are informal notions. There is no two meanings for truth, even if >> there are many theories because truth, by itself, is a very complicated >> notion. It is like consciousness. We all know well what it is, but theories >> are difficult to make, definitions do not exist, etc. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> In mechanist theology, that is the minimal faith in self-consistency. It >>>> is equivalent in believing in a reality/god/universe/whatever. >>> >>> No, you don't get to equate self-consistent with true. >> >> >> Indeed, nothing can be more different. We are self-consistent in dreams, for >> example. But in first order logic, or in effective higher order logic, it >> can be (meta)proved that self-consistency is equivalent with having a model. >> Gödel proved this in 1930. >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> It is close to the <>t of G, the implicit faith in our own consistency, >>>>>> which makes us inconsistent when made explicit, like with an axiom, >>>>>> postulate or proof. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Obviously, we have to do that every seconds, if we assume mechanism. >>>>>>>> The credence can be very high/ My point is more academical, if you >>>>>>>> want, no matter how I feel after the transplantation, it is never a >>>>>>>> “proof” that mechanism is correct, or that I have survived. Like I >>>>>>>> cannot prove that I am conscious. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You cannot prove any fact. You can only prove that some axioms entail >>>>>>> some theorems given some rules of inference. But you can have >>>>>>> evidence, you can test theories. To say it is never proof is trivial. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is the kind of trivialness that most people forget when doing >>>>>> metaphysics, especially when confusing physics and metaphysics, like the >>>>>> Aristotelian did explicitly at the beginning, but tend to become an >>>>>> habit of thought ever since. Many people have a problem to understand >>>>>> the difficulty of the mind-body problem, because they just confuse the >>>>>> physical science with the metaphysical sciences. They confuse evidence >>>>>> for the a physical reality and physical laws, with evidence for a >>>>>> primary physical evidence. My contribution is in >>>>>> showing that we can test/evaluate the dichotomy between Mechanism >>>>>> and Materialism. And up to now, Mechanism win. As far as we know, the >>>>>> physical reality behaves like it is emerging in the way that digital >>>>>> mechanism makes mandatory. >>>>> >>>>> Winning is making a surprising but correct prediction...not making a >>>>> small retrodiction. >>>> >>>> >>>> Small? Mechanism explains why there is physical reality. That was not >>>> obvious. >>> >>> It "explains" it by hypothesizing the reality of a UD...which is even less >>> obvious. >> >> >> The existence of a UD is a theorem of elementary arithmetic. Peano >> arithmetic can prove it already. > > But you're now confounding provable and true and using "existence" in the > sense of satisfying axioms as though it mean the same as in common discourse. The UD exist and is emulated in the same sense that the prime numbers are distributed in some ways. I am just clear. In the ontology only 0, s(0), …. exists. It is the whole point that when we assume that consciousness is invariant for some digital transformation, you would need to reify matter and attribute it some magical (Non Turing emulable, nor FPI-recoverable) property to make some computations more real than other, where in fact on the the self-referentially correct measure can be obtained by mathematical means, and then we can compare with Nature. Up to now, Arithmetic + its internal physical/material phenomenologies fits the facts, where physics still dismiss the first person (despite the tremendous progress made by Galileo, Einstein and Everett, or people like Boscovic or Rossler). > >> Robinson arithmetic might not prove it, but $we* can prove that it >> implements a UD too. The UD exists like the distribution of primes exists. I >> have never heard someone dismissing the Riemann hypothesis by saying that it >> presuppose the existence of the prime numbers. Same here. You might be the >> one speculating on some god-like notion like primary matter, and on some >> magical ability to make computations conscious, which makes no sense with >> the mechanist hypothesis. I am the skeptic here. The use of matter against >> mechanism is OK, but the evidence got so far is more for mechanism than >> materialism. You can’t have both. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> Many people were sure that all my modalities were collapsing into >>>> classical propositional calculus. Even if that would have been the case, >>>> the result would have been extra-ordinary, because that would have mean >>>> that physics is purely geographical, and that there is no law of physics. >>>> But the “material” modalities do not collapse, and they provide quantum >>>> logics. >>> >>> Have you considered that they did so because they are the result of >>> informaton processing by a being in a quantum world? >> >> That is how they can verify it. But the quantum here is a result in >> self-reference, without any assumption on the structure of the physical >> reality. All the interest relies in that similarity. >> >> >> >>> >>>> So not only we get the result that there is a genuine physical lawful >>>> reality, but that it obeys a quantum formalism. >>> >>> But you don't get that. You get only a little part of QM. >> >> I get the full theory, by construction. I get the full (non axiomatisable) >> quantum formalism. It is just that only the propositional part has been >> obtained, and even there most interesting formula are difficult to prove or >> verify. Same with nature. Then physics misses consciousness, and lack any >> consensus on how to interpreter the formalism. > > It doesn't miss it anymore than your theory. You just postulate that > consciousness corresponds to some theorems about self-reference. Not at all. I postulate only that consciousness is true for the machine I will be after the transplant made at the right level of description. Then I study what *any* sound machine can prove about itself at its correct level of description. Consciousness does not correspond to some theorem of self-reference, it is just that the machine point on something which are true for them, non doubtable, yet non provable, nor even definable, except by using approximation of truth, or the metatheories similar to the one by Theaetetus. > I can postulate that consciousness corresponds to physical representations of > the self. Yes, but if they are not Turing emulable, you leave the scope of my working hypothesis. And if they are Turing emulable, then they are executed in the infinitely many relative representations supported by infinitely computations, and without some magic, you cannot justify how your “non Turing emulable thing” select the computations executed in virtue of the trueness of (sigma1) relations. IF the S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* logics of physics would have depart strongly from quantum logic, not allowing any quantisation, I would say that this would have been an extraordinary result, as it would mean computationalism, in our classical indexical “theotechnological” sense if false, or that we are in a bostromina simulation run by malevolent beings (which I doubt). But, we got the quantisation where we need them. So “materialism”, like all ontological commitment is premature, I would say. > >> But we don’t have to compare physics and metaphysics. We have to compare >> physicalist metaphysics and the facts, and here the result is that >> physicalist metaphysics is refuted in the mechanist frame. You are free to >> propose a non-computationalist theory of mind. > > I have. Ah! But then you seem to use it to criticise my reasoning. If you are only critics on computationalism, we are out my scope of investigation. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> You cannot explain why it is based on complex number instead of >>> quaternions, why it decoheres to produce a classical world. And if you >>> assume things like complex valued variables then you can derive QM in many >>> different ways. >> >> But physics fails to make *any* prediction, without invoking an ontological >> commitment. I was so skeptic on materialism just for that reason, and that >> is why I study mathematics. Physics just do not even try to touch on the >> subject, > > ?? You complain that physics invokes ontological commitments (to what?) Yes, The physicist use an induction principle, to maintain the psycho-physical relation. To predict an eclipse, it assumes not just that there is a physical reality in which some planet will hide some star, say, but it predicts that this will happen in a reality where the computation accessing my mind state will be focused on that physical reality, like if the physical reality was able to select the computation (by which magic?). For computationalism to work, the physical reality below the substitution level must be given by a measure on infinitely many computations. And that works, when taking the self)referential constraints into account. So why add something, unless just to criticise computationalism. > in order to make predictions and then you complain physics does not touch the > subject!? Theoretical physics does not touch the subject. Applied physics touches it implicitly. That difficulty is not proper to physics, but to any science when it asserts something granted to be on the reality. It is trivial to bet the moon exist before sending humans or robots to it. But when doing metaphysics with the scientific method, we must be more aware of the ontological commitment, especially if it leads to technical difficulties. In their papers, no physicists ever address that question, except with the measurement problem in QM. Physics is just not Metaphysics. > Which is it? You make ontologlical commitments to computation. I make the common usual one made by all scientists: 0, 1, 2, 3, … and the laws we learned in school. Yes, I have to confess that I do believe rather strongly that there exists some number n such that n + n = 4. > So what? Almost all foundational theories make ontologcial commitments. The > virtuous circle of explanation is the only theory I know of that doesn't. > >> except when some subproblem of the mind-body problem becomes apparent, like >> with the question of reduction of the wave or not. >> >> >> >>> >>>> Then, we get three of them, and they are completely definite (and >>>> different) explaining why there are qualia and quanta, and all this from >>>> elementary arithmetic, and mechanism at the meta-level. >>> >>> You don't explain them. You speculate that they can be identified with >>> some aspects of conscious thought: That when I think about myself that has >>> something to do with Goedelian modeling arithmetical proofs within >>> arithmetic...which is a reach. >> >> >> No, it follows by the very definition of provability and the nuances imposed >> by incompleteness. It > > But what is "it". What follows are distinctions between what is provable and > consistency. You postulate that these model conscious thougths. I postulate that “I” am supported by a machine, then we can study what machines can proves about themselves, and listen to the theology that described. I postulate that those, not models, but theories or machines support consciousness, given that I have to do that when I say yes to the doctor. If a primitive physical reality was needed for that, tell me what it is, but I can no more say yes to the doctor: it might mean the level was not enough low (fine grained, isolated) or that computationalism is wrong. > >> follows from the assumption that “we are machine” (or we are supported by >> universal machine). There is no speculation at all. You make this up. >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> Thet solves not just the mind-body problem, but also the problem of why >>>> there is a physical universe. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Materialism makes many more correct predictions about consciousness, >>>> >>>> >>>> Not at all. Materialism invokes an ontological commitment, and has to >>>> assume the falsity of mechanism to allow an ad hoc and incomprehensible >>>> identification of mind and brain. >>> >>> There's no ontological commitment in observing that specific >>> electrostimulation of a brain evokes specific thoughts, >> >> OK. The speculation is in he link mind-matter used to interpret the >> experience. >> >> >>> that excising a part of the brain changes personality, that drugs that >>> enhance release of synaptic molecules cause hallucinations, that reality >>> proceeds according the laws of physics while you are unconscious. >> >> But here you do speculate on some primary matter or physics, > > There's no need to assume primary matter. The brain matter, the > electrostimulation, the patient...they all have ostensive definitions. The whole point of the step 6, or the dream argument, or the digital video game argument, is that an ostensive definition might only capture a phenomenological reality. Once you don’t assume primitive matter, you need to explain how the appearances of matter comes from. If it is still a physicalist, albeit mathematicalist, theory you will need to use special infinities, the one needed to depart from the physics in the head of all universal machine. No problem into searching in that direction, and the proposition physics of the machine can only help here. > >> and the whole point is that this is OK only by making the mind and the >> matter infinite enough, forcing to abandon computationalism. > > I can't see that it requires any infinities. But your theory does require > infinities. Goedel's theorem doesn't apply to finite systems. Gödel’s theorem applies to all system trying to talk about the machines in general. Goedl’s method of proof does not apply, and is not required, for some non Turing universal algebraical theories, of for first order *real* analysis (without trigonometry, so this is false for the complex numbers) > >> It is like inventing magic to refuse to see a problem. It is the “catholic >> Roman” old move to prevent scientific research. You just dismiss the >> mind-body problem. > > I'm citing real scientific research. Your arm chair speculation is the way > Catholic theologians. Which scientfific research? You are invoking a god (Matter or Physicalism) to defend a non computationalist theory of mind to criticise a testable theory, which avoid any ontological commitment, other the conditional one made on any terms of any sigma_1 complete theory. I’m afraid you are the one doing the speculation. I am the one who doubt, and propose an experimental testing procedure. > >> How would that matter select a computation, or a collection of computation >> to make them more conscious or more real than any other? > > The same way the computer in a autonomous car selects a computation to avoid > a collision. The problem occur only when you take the first person stance. My feeling is that you have shown much better understanding, and now you look like trying to forget the question. > >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> As it does not work (and we know why, cf the UDA), the more rigorous >>>> materialist have to eliminate consciousness, which just makes no sense at >>>> all. >>> >>> Materialists don't have to eliminate consciousness. That is only under >>> your theory that they are in conflict. >> >> But the Churchland and Dennett want them both, “my theory” >> (computationalism) and matter/physicalism. > > And you haven't proven there's any conflict. The conflict is the mind body problem, and in the computationalist theory, physics must be given by the “measure one” on the computations as seen from inside. The church land and Dennett still believe in the classical physical ontology which is in direct conflict with mechanism, but the QM many-world is not, and the math confirms this formally. > In fact when it comes to the brain it postulate the "filter" theory that > consciousness/soul is "out there" and just needs matter to manifest > itself...as it does in self-driving cars. The point is that with mechanism, that “matter” needs magic making me far less confident I can say “yes” to a doctor which will truncated me at some digital level. > >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> The materialist ontological commitment is the same as the one done by the >>>> creationist to criticise the evolution theory. That consists in assuming >>>> something for which we have no evidence to avoid the consequence of a >>>> theory which makes much less evidence. >>> >>> And makes no testable predictions. >> >> All the theorems of the material hypostases machine theories are testable >> predictions, and it fits with quantum logic. > > The quantum logic of Birkhoff? I see no testable predictions except first > person uncertainty and possibly linearity. Where does Planck's constant come > in? The Hamiltonian? Why a vector space? Why complex numbers? Read the papers in the domain. Already von Neuman hoped that the quantum mechanical formalism can be recovered by the “genuine” quantum logic, and somehow Gleason theorem makes it right, together with Pythagorus theorem. So, with Everett the QM formalism already looks like the computationalist solution of the mind-body problem. The problem of why complex numbers will be meet when we have a notion of dimension, so we are not yet there. But in metaphysics, I don’t no any other theory advanced enough in making precise prediction. Physics does not address the question, it is not its domain, although it could become if Nature departs really from the physics which *is* in the head of all universal numbers IF mechanism is true. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> Here you seem to confuse the physical science with metaphysical >>>> physicalism, which I have shown to be inconsistent (logically, >>>> epistemologically) with the mechanist assumption in the cognitive science. >>> >>> You have not shown that to me, only claimed it. >> >> ? >> >> (You have regressed since your first understanding of the UDA). Given that I >> have given the proofs, you must elaborate a lot here. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> even down to the specificity of localized electrostimulation of a brain >>>>> causing reproducible conscious thoughts. >>>> >>>> Mechanism explains this. Physicalism, if you study the details, does not. >>>> And cannot do it without abandoning mechanism. If you do believe it can, >>>> you must explain what is your primary matter and how it selects >>>> consciousness in the collection of all computations realised in the >>>> standard model of arithmetic (or equivalently, in *all* models of >>>> arithmetic). >>> >>> That's nonsense. Let us hear your "study of the details". It is a >>> empirical result and doesn't depend on abandoning mechanism (whatever >>> "mechanism" means, is it the same as "computationalism"?) or any theory. >> >> >> Just tell me the role of matter in your consciousness theory. I have >> explained in all details (and see most of may papers) that you cannot give >> such a role to matter without violating mechanism/computationalism. The use >> of primary matter is pure magic. You evacuate the fglobal (on UD*) first >> person indeterminacy. >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> Brent, I think you are again in a dismissive mode with respect to the >>>> mind-body problem. >>> >>> Not at all. I have explained my view of it several times on this forum. >>> Just because I conceive a different view of the problem doesn't mean I >>> dismiss it. >> >> Of course you dismiss it. Even by doing Seamless error (as explained last >> years). You should just give your non computationalist theory of mind, or if >> you still want to keep both mechanism and materialism, you should explain us >> the role of the primary matter and how it selects the computation in >> arithmetic. You are the one speculating on something very mysterious, for >> which there are never been the slightest evidences, and on the contrary, >> many evidences against. That is even how science begun: doubting that >> reality is WYSIWYG with Plato. Aristotle metaphysics is only an attempt to >> hide what the Pythagorean and the Platonist was unveiling: the non existence >> of a primitively real physical universe. It is all in the head of the >> universal numbers. Well, as long as we have no evidence of the contrary, as >> this provides the unique explanation making sense of the relation between >> mind and observations. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.