On 3/2/2018 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It doesn't miss it anymore than your theory.  You just postulate that consciousness corresponds to some theorems about self-reference.

Not at all. I postulate only that consciousness is true for the machine I will be after the transplant made at the right level of description.

Then I study what *any* sound machine can prove about itself at its correct level of description.

But why should that have anything to do with its perception of self.


Consciousness does not correspond to some theorem of self-reference, it is just that the machine point on something which are true for them,  non doubtable, yet non provable, nor even definable,

You say it does not correspond to some theorem of self-reference, but then you imply it corresponds to deriving a Goedel sentence about themselves.  That's non doubtable but non provable.  But it's also nothing to do with human consciousness.  I only know very few humans are even aware of what a Goedel sentence is.

except by using approximation of truth, or the metatheories similar to the one by Theaetetus.

That "approximation of truth" is a completely different attribute than "correspondence with facts".

Brent

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