> On 13 Apr 2018, at 21:08, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 4/13/2018 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Your theory doesn't explain it without "adding more magic" either. You
>>> start by assuming that certain computations must instantiate consciousness.
>> You confuse UDA and AUDA. The UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) assumes
>> mechanism, which is the statement that we can survive with a digital brain
>> prosthesis, which is believed by anyone who does not add magic in the
>> brain). This assume consciousness, brains, doctors, computers, etc.
>> But the UDA motivates to “redo” the thought experience “in arithmetic”,
> But the very assumption that there is "thought experience" in arithmetic is
> added "magic" to the computation of arithmetic.
That is not magic. That follows from Mechanism. If you believe that the
universal machine emulated by the arithmetical reality are not conscious, you
get inconsistent with the assumption that we can survive with an an artificial
digital brain, and also, you get something weird in arithmetic itself, like
zombies having this very conversation. This is not obvious, that is why I give
the detailed proof in the thesis and paper. You are the one invoking a primary
matter than nobody can even define, and use it to criticise a theory which just
do not make that assumption. Your critics is equivalent as criticising Darwin
evolution theory because it does not explains the content of the bible.
>> which means limiting the statements on the semi-computable propositions (the
>> sigma_1 sentences) and looking at all the platonic nuances enforced by
>> Then if you are OK with the idea that consciousness is something true,
>> known, undoubtable, yet non definable, and non provable, then those nuances
>> shows that a machine which looks inward does met notion pertaining on itself
>> obeying that semi-axiomatic definition, like the machine meets a notion of
>> matter, which obeys quantum logic, and has to give a measure on them.
>> (Assuming here both QM is correct, and that we are not in a normal
>> malevolent simulation, to be exact).
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