> On 12 May 2018, at 22:23, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/11/2018 9:01 PM, Dustin Wehr wrote: >> I'm a big fan of Tegmark's 2007 article The Mathematical Universe, but I >> believe he got a couple details wrong, and those details are interfering >> with my attempts to interest friends. So, I'm looking for an exposition of >> the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, of a similar or shorter length, that >> omits those details, so that I have something I can recommend to others >> without qualification. I can recommend Tegmark's Consciousness is a >> Mathematical Pattern TED talk without qualification, but I need something >> that goes further, particularly for people with a STEM background. >> >> There should be nothing about the Computable Universe Hypothesis. There >> should be nothing about Gödel's incompleteness theorems, unless it's to >> explain why they do not pose a problem. >> >> Ideally there is no claim about the MUH being testable. What would be >> wonderful, in its place, is an admission that the MUH is probably >> unfalsifiable, followed by a persuasive argument for why we should reset our >> expectations when it comes to entertaining/evaluating a theory of everything. > > Richard Dawid has written a book advocating an approach to science that > abandons Popper's dictum. > > https://www.amazon.com/String-Theory-Scientific-Method-Richard/dp/1107449618/ref=sr_1_7 > > <https://www.amazon.com/String-Theory-Scientific-Method-Richard/dp/1107449618/ref=sr_1_7> > > > I, however, found it less than persuasive. But I also found the MUH > incoherent. I understand Tegmark has more recently retreated to a > Computational Universe Hypothesis which may be coherent, but still wrong.
A computable universe would entail computationalism in cognitive science, but this has been shown to entail the impossibility of a computational universe (by the fact that we get the first person indeterminacy under our substitution level). So A computable universe does not make sense, with or without Mechanism. Tegmark is mathematicalist, like computationalism entailed (since long), but he applies computationalism wrongly. Like Chalmers, he seems to dismiss the mechanist first person indeterminacy. His mathematicalism seems still to much tainted by Aristotle theology (physicalism). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
