On Sunday, October 7, 2018 at 10:35:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Oct 2018, at 15:55, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
> Matter is a mystery. Some think that there's a hard problem of 
> consciousness [1]. But actually, there's a hard problem of matter [2,3].
>
>
> [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
> [2] 
> https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html
> [3] http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious :
>
> *When we look at what physics tells us about the brain, we actually just 
> find software—purely a set of relations—all the way down. *
>
>
> Are you not confusing the theories (which can be see as a sort of 
> software, although not necessarily computable) and what the theories are 
> supposed to be about, which might be some “ontological real field” of 
> something?
>
> Mechanism assumes we can truncate the “all the way down” so as to be able 
> to “save our soul” temporarily on a disk. This salvation is relative to 
> some reality/computation(s).
>
>
>
>
>
> *And consciousness is in fact more like hardware, because of its 
> distinctly qualitative, non-structural properties. For this reason, 
> conscious experiences are just the kind of things that physical structure 
> could be the structure of.*
>
>
> I see your point, but find it very weird. You make consciousness into an 
> inert sort of substance. I don’t think this solves the hard problem of 
> consciousness nor the hard problem of matter. It identify again the too, 
> without justifying where that come from.
>
>
>
>
>
> *Given this solution to the hard problem of matter, the hard problem of 
> consciousness all but dissolves. There is no longer any question of how 
> consciousness arises from non-conscious matter, because all matter is 
> intrinsically conscious. There is no longer a question of how consciousness 
> depends on matter, because it is matter that depends on consciousness—as 
> relations depend on relata, structure depends on realizer, or software on 
> hardware.*
>
>
>
> With mechanism, the mind-body problem is reduced to the problem of 
> justifying the appearance of matter from the statistics on all computations 
> going through your local and actual (indexically defined, and thus 
> relative) computational state. The math has been done, and this provides a 
> quantum logic for the “probability one” first person (plural) events. The 
> world would have been Newtonian, we would have good reason to suspect 
> Mechanism to be false, but quantum mechanics seems, up to now, to look very 
> like the computationalist solution of the mind body problem.
>
> Then, consciousness is only a semantical fixed point of all machines. It 
> is, from the first person point of view of the machine, something felt as 
> immediately true, indubitable, non justifiable, and non definable.
>
> I can somehow make sense of what you say, because here the theory of 
> consciousness is mainly the modal logic G1*, and the theory of matter is 
> Z1*, and it appears that they are bisimilar: so, matter and consciousness 
> are not just two modes of arithmetical self-knowledge, but they are 
> faithful representation of each other. Now, that is not entirely true, 
> because the “indubitability” need a slight different theory (X1*), which is 
> NOT bisimilar to G, nor any other self-referential modes.
>
> I recall;
>
> G is the modal logic of the arithmetical BEWEISBAR predicate of Gödel. It 
> is “provability” (in German), but from incompleteness it is not a knowledge 
> predicate, and it behaves more like a relative rational justifiability. 
>
> And G is the provable part of that logic. (First theorem of Solovay)
>
> The true part, is given by the modal logic G* (Second theorem of Solovay).
>
> The corona G* \ G is the surrational corona, or the proper theological 
> part: all what is true but not justifiable (yet perhaps knowable, 
> observable, feelable, …).
>
> G is a normal modal logic, with a Kripke semantics available, and unique 
> (main) axiom the formula of Löb:
> []([]p -> p) -> []p
>
> G* has as axioms all theorems of G, + the axioms []p -> p. 
>
> G1 and G1*, have the axiom p->[]p for p atomic. This captures the 
> limitation of the arithmetical formula to the leaves of the universal 
> dovetailer (it is the modal version of Mechanism).
>
> The other modes are given by all the variants offered by incompleteness, 
>
> like the logic of []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p. Which (with p -> []p) 
> provides three different quantum logics.
>
> Motivations for such variants are directly given by the theorems of Gödel 
> and Löb, but in the frame of mechanism, can be motivated through tough 
> experiences, or through the study of the neoplatonist theologies (Plotinus, 
> Proclus, Moderatus of Gades, Parmenides (Plato), etc.).
>
> All theories, including theories of consciousness or of God(s) need to 
> have testable consequence. Some theories can appear to be just an emphasis 
> on some modes of self-reference, and your account on consciousness is 
> interesting as it confirms that some bisimilarities might be at plays among 
> the modes of self-reference, a point made by Stephen Paul King (on this 
> list, years ago) which has intrigued me.
> Now, to interpret what you say as an argument against mechanism, might be 
> labeled as a confusion between G* and Z*, I’m afraid. Or, you would need to 
> give an experimental evidence for matter not obeying to Z (Z1*, …).
>
> Bruno
>



To be clear, the texts are from article [3] by 

Hedda Hassel Mørch
@heddamorch <https://twitter.com/heddamorch>
https://heddahasselmorch.wordpress.com/

The way I express it:

The "physical" is just information (numbers, platonic computation).
The "material" is the whole shebang (information & experience).


- pt 

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