On Friday, November 23, 2018 at 4:11:26 PM UTC-6, Mason Green wrote:
>
> Hi everyone, 
>
> I found an interesting blog post that attempts to refute the Doomsday 
> Argument. It suggests that different worlds ought to be weighted by the 
> number of people in them, so that you should be more likely to find 
> yourself in a world where there will be many humans, as opposed to just a 
> few. This would cancel out the unlikeliness of finding yourself among the 
> first humans in such a world. 
>
> I’m curious as to what the contributors here think. (I’m new here, I found 
> out about this list through Russell’s Theory of Nothing book). 
>
> https://risingentropy.com/2018/09/06/adam-and-eves-anthropic-superpowers/ 
>
> -Mason



Without examining the theoretical details of this (or any) probabilistic 
argument (including Bayesian ones), one general approach is this: The 
theory may all be correct of course (given accepted assumptions), but it's 
ultimately convincing when results are compared to Monte Carlo computer 
experiments. (If you don't like don't "trust" your software's random 
numbers, then you can get some from [ 
https://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/secure_generate.html ]).

Say in the case of "In front of you is a jar. This jar contains either 10 
balls or 100 balls. The balls are numbered in order from 1 to either 10 or 
100." Then you you write a program that randomly creates either a 
10ball-jar with probability 0.50 (or any p) or a 100ball-jar with 
probability 0.50 (or 1-p) and then pick a ball at random. You run this 
10,000 times (or whatever) and just get statistics.

You can do this for the Monte Hall problem - which has the irony that Monte 
Carlo "solves" the Monte Hall problem!

- pt
 

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