> On 4 Dec 2018, at 02:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 12/3/2018 9:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> But that is close to the solipsist move. The fact that we cannot define >> truth does not entail that some notion of truth does not make sense. In >> particular, Peano arithmetic can already define an infinity of approximation >> of truth, namely sigma_i and pi_i truth (the truth of the sentences will a >> finite and fixed number of quantifier, as opposed to finite sentences with >> an arbitrary finite number of quantifier). >> >> We can invoke truth, but we can develop meta-discourse relating truth to >> theories, like we cannot invoke our own consciousness does not prevent us to >> try theories about it. >> It is a bit like “I cannot study my own brain”, but I can still infer some >> theories of my brain by looking at the brain of others and then assuming >> that I am not different. > > So are do these theories produce true or false propositions?
You quote me (Bruno), here. You are the judge. In our (mechanist) case, this follows from elementary arithmetic. > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> A different perspective (!) of "truth" comes from - vs. PA (Peano >> arithmetic) - PLT (programming language theory - the legacy to a large >> extent of John C. Reynolds [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Reynolds >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Reynolds> - who was originally a >> theoretical physicist ], and sort of in parallel the whole type-theory >> gang). Rather than an external "god-like" notion of truth, truth is in the >> programming. >> >> - pt >> >> > Can you give an example of "truth in the programming" and how it differs from > the mathematical idea of true and the correspondence theory of truth? I let Philip Thrift answer this one. I use always Tarski’s theory (correspondence with respect to some model/reality assumed). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
