On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>>>> *computationalism 
>>>>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>>>>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>>>>> Strawson):
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>>>>
>>>>>  -pt
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>] — 
>>>> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
>>>> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
>>>> computationalism is fiction.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>>>
>>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>>>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>>>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>>>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>>> solutions.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>> (like us).
>>>
>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>>> than in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
>>> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
>>> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Example: The Turing 
>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>  
>>> ].
>>>
>>>
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>> "boring”.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
>>> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>
>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>> Computing
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>> etc.
>>
>>
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>
>>
>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
>> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
>> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
>> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
>> notion of computation.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Of course UC says CTT is false. 
>
>
>
> Some UC people might say that. Others are neutral. Others accept CTT.
>
> CTT implies incompleteness directly (in one diagonalisation, as I showed 
> recently in the Church’s thesis thread. (I do it again if you want). 
>
> CT saves the numbers and the machine from all conventional conception of 
> them.
>
> CT + Mechanism implies a Negative Theology, like in the line from 
> Parmenides to Damascius.
>
> CT implies that to get control on the security zone you are confronted to 
> the insecurity zone. 
>
> After Gödel, we have to abandon our reductionist conception of numbers and 
> machines.
>
> Beware the Unconventional Digital Machine. Beware the Unconventional 
> Numbers.
>
> You know, there is a common argument against the idea that Jesus-Christ 
> did really transform some water into wine, or that we should take seriously 
> a witnessing of it. The argument is that, if that event actually occurred, 
> the most plausible explanation would be that Jesus Christ would be a 
> prestidigitator, given the known ability of prestidigitators and the high 
> credulity of humans in general.
>
> Now, I am not sure what it means exactly by believing in universe, gods, 
> and non conventional things, I think that the simplest explanation is the 
> (not well known yet already practiced) prestidigitation ability of the 
> numbers. The universal numbers, notably, can make you believe a lot of 
> things.
>
> I am skeptical about adding complexity when we are understanding that we 
> already do not understand the simplest things.
>
>
>
>
>
> (Pragmatists don't get "hung up" with truth, as you know.) 
>
>
>
> Only until they are confronted with it.
>
>
>
>
>
> It's the UCNC conferences, which is a bit odd, but they put UC and NC 
> together. I don't really like NC. Just UC, since I think that's clearer. 
>
>
>
> It is more unconventional thinking about things, without being involved 
> necessarily in metaphysics, more in application down to earth.
>
> If CTT is judged conventional, I think that this is a mistake, as CT 
> enforce the failing of all conventional conception we can have of the 
> machine. It can only be a sort of misunderstanding of CTT. 
>
> There are simple things easy to define, but explosive in complexity, like 
> when mixing addition and multiplication, or application and abstraction.
>
> The use of “unconventional” is weird, as I am not sure it can work with 
> the universal machine, which might transcend all conventions.
>
> Anyway, with the distinction imposed by incompleteness on the self modes 
> of view, we can see the universal machine is born a bit schizophrenic and 
> is always capable of being deluded. 
>
> On day one, God created the Natural Numbers, and said “that is good”.
>
> On day two, God told the Numbers “Add yourself”, and said”Oh! That is 
> good”.
>
> On day three, God told the Numbers “multiply yourself”. And God said … 
> “Oops!”.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


vs. the CT thesis, there is the PLTOS thesis:

>From [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]:

0.1. PTLOS configurations


A configuration PTLOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) — lower case Greek letters π, λ, τ, ο, and 
capital Greek letter Σ are variables that take on concrete (particular) 
values — is defined:


PLTOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) designates a program π that is written in a language λ 
that is transformed via a compiler/assembler τ into an output object ο that 
executes in a computing substrate Σ.


0.2. “Material PLTOS Thesis”:

Every material (alt. physical) phenomenon can be effectively represented by 
some PLTOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ).


...


In PLTOS, numbers are not the "basic" substrate. Materialities* are.

*from phenomenological-oriented philosophy

- pt

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