On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
In any case, one of the "micropsychists" has a new paper just out:
"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious
entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together
to form a single unified consciousness. ..."
*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that
consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or
maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the
intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but
maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical.
A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a
In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but
rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any theory of
consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, the following
three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is
intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other
conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM:
Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per
standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of
this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily
less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also
consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting
INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject
NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best
option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than
INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.
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