On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 04:06:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But when used in physics, this type of inductive inference assume not only a
> reality, but a “brain-mind” identity, which is not consistent with the
> mechanist hypothesis.

How so? All it assumes is that there is a relationship (correlation if
you will) between elements of phenomenology. If something is
phenomenally true (observed) , then some other thing is likely to be
phenomenally true.

It is up to the learning algorithm to figure out what the relationships are.

None of this assumes reality, nor any sort of mind-brain identity.


Dr Russell Standish                    Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow        hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University         http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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