But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and Popper made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. It is part of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the physical proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond the terms needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense). > -- which depends on its material computing substrate That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it can be implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the arithmetical realm, and anything emulated in that programming language cannot see any difference if the original emulator is the physical one or the arithmetical one. That is logically impossible, even without assuming mechanism. If you want a dependence from the substrate, you need a non computaionalist theory of mind, and you need to singularise matter with actual infinities, a bit like lowing down the substitution level up to some real numbers and oracles with some infinite precision. > -- in addition to (substrate-independent) denotational and operational > semantics . That includes quantum programming languages, like QASM [ > https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03429 ] (for IBM's Q computer). Same remark. All quantum computers + oracle are simulated in the partial computable part of arithmetic, which (of course?) requires a vaster part of arithmetic to be studied and get semantics. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com > <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.