> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>>  
>> <https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/>
>> 
>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
> 
> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly relevant 
> for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
> 
> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something (what 
> exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. Theologically, 
> it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing science.
> 
> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
> requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many accessible 
> histories at (or below) our substitution level.
> 
> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, nor 
> eliminated, nor duplicated. 
> 
> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost Turing 
> universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we can 
> regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, or 
> not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where energy 
> is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative subcomputation 
> are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to apparent (indexical) 
> breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of “memories”. There are 
> Turing universal group and group have natural mesure theory associated with 
> them, but again, such group must be justified mathematically (and 
> theologically to get the private (first person) parts not eliminated). 
> 
> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To be 
> honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than from 
> Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes me 
> nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains well 
> why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
> between fundamental physics and number theory).
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo>
> 
> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to Hardy 
> Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of a 
> number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and classification 
> of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Every programming language has physical semantics

But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and Popper 
made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. It is part 
of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the physical 
proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond the terms 
needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the 
Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense).





> -- which depends on its material computing substrate

That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it can be 
implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the arithmetical 
realm, and anything emulated in that programming language cannot see any 
difference if the original emulator is the physical one or the arithmetical 
one. That is logically impossible, even without assuming mechanism.

If you want a dependence from the substrate, you need a non computaionalist 
theory of mind, and you need to singularise matter with actual infinities, a 
bit like lowing down the substitution level up to some real numbers and oracles 
with some infinite precision.




> -- in addition to (substrate-independent) denotational and operational 
> semantics . That includes quantum programming languages, like QASM [ 
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03429 ] (for IBM's Q computer).


Same remark. All quantum computers + oracle are simulated in the partial 
computable part of arithmetic, which (of course?) requires a vaster part of 
arithmetic to be studied and get semantics.

Bruno





> 
>  - pt
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