On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
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> On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
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> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
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>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
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>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>>>>> information 
>>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
>>>> "*first-class 
>>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>>> always 
>>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>>>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>>>
>>>> John K Clark
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>> reduced to information processing. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>>
>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>> "second-class".)
>>>
>>>
>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>> unsupported assertion?
>>
>>
>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>> eliminated.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
> consciousnessless.  
>
> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
> glia, ...
>
>
> Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that machines can 
> never really think.  A pathetic hubris.
>
>
> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
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> It does in the simulated world.
>
> Brent
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> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>
> @philipthrift
> -- 
>
>
The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as a 
naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse even than 
the* telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any significant way 
anyway).

The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot throw 
stones (even simulated ones).

@philipthrift

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