*Finitistic Higher Order Logic*
Matthias Eberl
[slides] http://www.math.lmu.de/~petrakis/Eberl.pdf

A finititstic understanding of mathematics
Forerunner: Jan Mycielski (Locally finite theories, JSL ’86)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942

Main idea:
Infinite sets are not actual infinite, but indefinitely extensible —
This applies also to the syntax. No notion of computability.

from http://www.math.lmu.de/~petrakis/ABM17.php :

We follow a finitistic approach initially presented by Jan Mycielski for 
first order logic (locally finite theories, JSL '86). Different to 
Mycielski's approach we use a model theory based on the idea that all 
infinite sets are replaced by indefinitely extensible sets --- formally 
these are families of sets. The interpretation then uses a kind of 
reflection principle whereby the universal quantifier ranges over 
sufficiently large finite sets, not over infinite sets. This works fine for 
first order logic in which the objects are finite and only infinite sets of 
objects are approximated by finite sets. In order to extend this idea to 
higher order logic in form of simple type theory (STT) we additionally have 
to consider infinite objects (functions), which are approximated 
themselves. In order to formulate a finitistic version thereof we 
approximate function spaces of higher types by finite sets of finite 
approximations of these functions. These finite function spaces are related 
by partial surjections (on higher types defined as logical relations) and 
we introduce a new notion of a limit for them. The limit structure is then 
equipped with a family of partial equivalence relations (PERs), 
approximating equality. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
families of finite sets of finite approximations and the infinite limit 
structures. Different to domain theory we use total functions in order to 
have the usual classical truth values and use STT as a higher order logic.



@philipthrift

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