*A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms in the Study of the Mind* Stan B. Klein Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences University of California at Santa Barbara https://philpapers.org/archive/KLEADO-3.pdf
Abstract In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory) – that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A “science of mind” that approaches its subject matter from a third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed skepticism. In my view, science needs to adopt a new, more inclusive, metaphysics, one in which reality is not reduced to only that which can be captured by current scientific methods. I thank Galen Strawson for suggesting the quote at the beginning of this article, as well as for insightful comments on the text. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cbdfe9b5-1664-4d79-8c32-53302dd57766%40googlegroups.com.
