On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:08:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:03:14 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:56:33 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion >>>>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, >>>>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the >>>>> wf. >>>>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and >>>>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same >>>>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, >>>>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and >>>>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a >>>> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump >>>> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their >>>> skis. >>>> >>>> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality* >>>> Ronald N. Giere >>>> >>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality >>>> >>>> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation >>>> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like >>>> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of >>>> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue >>>> that >>>> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the >>>> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to >>>> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the >>>> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, >>>> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use >>>> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form >>>> both hypotheses and generalizations. >>>> >>>> @philipthrift. >>>> >>> >>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they >>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you >>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true >>> as our present understanding? AG >>> >> >> >> >> One is much better than another* truthiness*-wise. >> >> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you >> find it. >> >> @philipthrift >> > > Don't put words in my mouth. All physical models are provisional, but I > don't accept what I consider philosophical BS that you posted here > previously. AG >
It's models up and down, as Vic would say. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ce2e8a0e-32d2-4821-9651-5b15bfff8f2a%40googlegroups.com.
