On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:57:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:21:19 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion >>>>>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, >>>>>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the >>>>>> wf. >>>>>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and >>>>>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same >>>>>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, >>>>>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system >>>>>> and >>>>>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a >>>>> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump >>>>> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their >>>>> skis. >>>>> >>>>> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality* >>>>> Ronald N. Giere >>>>> >>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality >>>>> >>>>> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation >>>>> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like >>>>> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of >>>>> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue >>>>> that >>>>> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the >>>>> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models >>>>> to >>>>> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the >>>>> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, >>>>> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use >>>>> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form >>>>> both hypotheses and generalizations. >>>>> >>>>> @philipthrift. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they >>>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you >>>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true >>>> as our present understanding? AG >>>> >>> >>> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological >>> versus epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this >>> is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so >>> prevalent today. AG >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> There is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness, and quantum >> stuff happens without humans. >> > > So does everything else; what we call the Laws of Physics or the Laws of > Nature. AG > > >> Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult >> of physicists who got into that. >> > > If the wf were ontological, we could see one directly. What does one look > like? AG > >> >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> There are no "laws" (how did that word get into science?) and there is no wave function.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2382 https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0610204 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15819/1/Allori-Ex-nat-metaph-OUP-latest-draft.pdf https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-theory-rebuilt-from-simple-physical-principles-20170830/ @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e3d6b38b-f0d0-4d38-b262-302b90163198%40googlegroups.com.
