> On 28 Nov 2019, at 16:51, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:43 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about > >> because after its all over it's clear who has won, > > > In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication too. > > No it is not. In the duplicating machine case even after it's all over it's > not at all clear who has won because I hear 2 equally loud and equally valid > voices demanding that they deserve to receive the title "you”.
That is right, and it is nice to listen to them both, as you should (given the definition of first person), and when you listen to each of them, you realise that they know perfectly who they are. The guy in W says “I find myself clearly in W, and could not have guessed this in H”, and the guy in M says "“I find myself clearly in M, and could not have guessed this in H”. > in the Everett case it's clear who won because I hear only one voice that > claims to be Mr. You. Then you need to enter the cut-and-read box. In W you will only one voice, and in M too. > > >> there is only one person around who has inherited the grand title of "you”. > > > Same in W, and same in M, > > Right, it's the same except there are 2 people around instead of one; or to > put it another way, it's about as far from "the same" as you can get. It is the same “same” as I will remain the same guy after I finish this sentence. > > > except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant with mechanism). > > With mechanism! That's your standard catch phrase you use whenever you get > into trouble, It is my working hypothesis (and your’s, as you have already "said yes" to a doctor). > but mechanism just says natural phenomena should be explained by reference to > matter Not at all, or you invoke a non digital-mechanist hypothesis. Once you assume you survive a physical brain digital transplant, you can no more invoke a god (be it an irreducible matter or a superman in the sky) to identify your consciousness with any particular body appearance in arithmetic. You need not just a physical universe, but a physical universe + a non-dogital-mechanist theory of mind. > and the laws of motion, and I don't know what proof you're referring to, I > hope it's not the silly one with wall to wall personal pronouns and a > personal pronoun duplicating machine. > > >> and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is > >> suposed to be about. > > > I bet one dollar with you that you will [...] > > Since "you" duplicating machines are involved that's all that needs to be > said, that's enough information to know NOT to make the bet because John > Clark refuses to make a bet when John Clark doesn't know exactly, or even > approximately, what the hell the bet is. Just enter the cut-read box. That’s how I discover the first person *plural* as my boss wanted me to use the bet procedure for defining the notion of probability (he was against the frequentist definition). He got immediately the point, and get also the important difference between first person singular and the first person plural. The arithmetical entanglement is provided by this simple acts: accompanying the candidate in the read-cut box. > > > The prediction is on the first person feeling, > > And because a first person feeling duplicating machine is involved there is > no such thing as THE first person feeling. Of course there is. We just cannot predict which one we live, but it still exist, unless you die in the duplicating process. > > > There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is > > something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the > > experience. > > No there is not. The experience had 2 outcomes so it is only meaningful to > talk about A first person experience. The outcome here are the first person experience, and with mechanism, it remains clear that in this duplication experience, both lives only one first person experience, and obviously, any prediction of the particular place would be refuted by one guy, and so cannot do. But both confirms that they got “THE” experience. It is as relative than in Everett relative state. > > > Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to listen > > to both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be correct. > > The bet was what one and only one city will you end up seeing, if both are > correct then neither won because the bet was just stupid. Well, if in Helsinki you bet W, then the fact that the W guy refuted it shows that we can lost the bet, locally and indexically, as expected for a notion of first person. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0-Zoz0zqk2ApScbr%2BetJL6DgB-zes0SWvCHjoMou-s_Q%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0-Zoz0zqk2ApScbr%2BetJL6DgB-zes0SWvCHjoMou-s_Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/340FE1BC-BF6A-4BF2-9A69-6C44CC98C8B2%40ulb.ac.be.
