> On 7 Dec 2019, at 00:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 12/6/2019 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Dec 2019, at 00:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, >>>>>>>> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly >>>>>>>> actions as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for >>>>>>>> consciousness, >>>>>>> It's not clear to me. How can there be a response to an input ("input" >>>>>>> to what) that doesn't occur? And why would such a response be anything >>>>>>> but crazy? >>>>>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy. I have a dog. If my dog died >>>>> I'd get another dog. My dog didn't die today. The counterfact then is >>>>> that my dog did die today. So responding the counterfact I get another >>>>> dog. >>>> >>>> In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not >>>> relevant here, but it has to make sense) >>> >>> So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs". You meant >>> responses in some different world, where the input and the response (and >>> maybe everything else) are different. >> >> That is modal realism, but I made precise I don’t use this here. That is why >> I said “relatively real or not”. Usually, the counterfactuals and their >> consequences are judged unreal, but in modal realist context, like with >> Everett and with Mechanism, they get real (with high or low relative >> measure). >> The counterfactual reality are always as close as possible as the factual >> input. We can say, if Hitler was a nice guy there would not have been an >> holocaust (that is a common reasonable counterfactual). But we cannot say >> (to illustrate counterfactuals) “If Hitler was good, pigs would been able to >> fly”. That is not a counterfactual. It is at best a statement that Hitler >> (perhaps by definition of Hitler) is intrinsically bad, or something. >> >> Similarly “if the alarm did not ring, the plane would have crashed” is a >> reasonable counterfactual statement. But “If the alarm did not ring chicken >> would have teeth”, would mean that it is absolutely impossible that the >> alarm could not ring. > > You take extreme examples, but where is the line. How do you know that in the > world where Hitler is a nice guy it is necessarily true that pigs fly?
Yes, that is not a counterfactual. Assuming that Hitler is not nice guy, the fact that pigs can fly is implied by the fact that Hitler is a nice guy. That is why the classical implication is NOT a counterfactuals. It is also classical true that if Hither is a nice guy, Pigs cannot fly. So if Hitler is a nice guy, pigs can and cannot fly, which is a contradiction, and that is a proof by absurdum reductio that Hitler is not a nice guy, and not a very convincing one, given that it assumes this at the start. > You claim that all that is real is the same as the totality of computation. I claim that if we assume digital mechanism, elementary arithmetic cannot be completed for the ontology. But that does not mean that only number and computation are real, as the whole 1p internal phenomenology is provable much richer than arithmetic. The whole of mathematics is not enough to get the whole internal (to arithmetic) phenomenology. > So from you premise can you prove what you asserted...or is it just an > assertion? I can prove it, but that is irrelevant, as the goal is to derive physics from what machines can prove and cannot prove, as we should, when we assume Mechanism. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7963e261-b1a9-bb87-62fc-1f4518dd6686%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7963e261-b1a9-bb87-62fc-1f4518dd6686%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8D3F7C54-0FE3-468B-A086-C956DF370B40%40ulb.ac.be.
