> On 10 Dec 2019, at 21:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 12/10/2019 4:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> I wrote "my apple" so it is indicial and I define it ostensively, which is >>> concrete. >> >> Relatively to you and me. It seems concrete because we have billions of >> interconnected amoebas working hard to make us easily recognising fruits >> from poison and preys from predators. There is huge implicit context, but we >> still have no theory capable of explaining what an apple is, especially >> explaining why it falls on the ground (cf the lack of a coherent quantum >> theory of gravitation). Concreteness is in the eye of the beholder ... >> >> >> >>> You seem to have swapped the meanings "concrete" and "abstract". Dr >>> Johnson could kick my apple, even if he can't kick apple. >> >> That’s the problem. How do you relate “your apple” with apple. With >> mechanism, even “your apple” is still a sort of type for infinitely many >> “apples” in a complex superposition state, and nobody agree how to interpret >> those state. > > Not when I define it ostensively.
That is good in practice, but should be avoided in a fundamental theory, or you will end up telling me that the universe exist because God shows it ostensively to us all the time. And of course, in the digital mechanist frame, apple can be said to exist in arithmetic, in *your* sense of “exist" because there are infinities of numbers showing them ostensively to their “number” fellows. > >> With mechanism, we know that any piece of matter is a projection from a >> space of computations into itself. > > But you can't exhibit this projection. You just assume it must exist since > otherwise "mechanism" is false. I just don’t say that 'it has to exist since otherwise mechanism is false’. I say also that it has to exist in the self-referential mode of Gödel’s arithmetical beweisbar predicate, since otherwise mechanism is false. That is the easy part. It took me 30 years to do the math and to derive intuitionistic logic for the first person knowledge, and, more importantly for the empiricists, to derive quantum logics exactly where expected for the observable, and a nest of (richer ) intuitionistic quantum logics for the sensible. I just assume mechanism. I derive indeed from mechanism that physics is a statistic on the sigma_1 (true) sentences structured by the variate notion of machines’ beliefs implied by incompleteness, like p, []p, []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p, and many others. If you read Plotinus in the chronological order (not Porphyry’s Enneads order), you can see Plotinus found those modes in the same order. Simplicius related them to Parmenides five affirmative hypothesis. The projection is exhibited by the arithmetical quantisation ([]<>p, with the “[]” defined by the observable modes. That transforms the computationalist mind-body problem into a sequence of problem in mathematics, and a sequence of experimental devices in physics. Up to now, for anyone accepting QM (and rejecting the collapse) we can say that nature confirms the striking (for Aristotelian Naturalists) weirdness that the Platonician warned us about in advance. The cells, brain and other universal number (Church, Turing, Kleene, Post, …) have not been created to solve the Riddle of Reality. Yet the universal number can’t resist exploring the question. Bruno > >> >> Your notion of “concreteness” is all we need here and now to eat apple and >> make simple prediction, but this simplicity is misleading when the question >> becomes more fundamental, on the how and why. > > What it misleading is to take a word who's use we agreed on to communicate > clearly and assert it must have a different meaning because that satisfies > your theory. It's the same move you make with "God" and "theology". > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a696da97-1047-811c-fd53-ff0a78162e34%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6F4A4EB6-4B43-4AC1-AD31-3451C9A07393%40ulb.ac.be.
