> On 11 Dec 2019, at 11:08, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:00 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>Yesterday before the duplication when there was only ONE, which ONE of the > >>ONE ended up seeing what ONE of them is seeing NOW? > > > We are in the semi-duplication context, > > Semi-duplication?
Typo error, sorry. Read “self-duplication”. > You are assuming there is something non-material that the Matter Duplicating > Machine can not duplicate (aka the soul), you're assuming the very thing > you're trying to prove. Mechanism implies that the soul is immaterial, where the soul can be defined by the owner of the memory (and it exists provably as something emulated by the arithmetical relations). If Mechanism is true, we can change our bodies everyday, and that can help to understand that both our 1p and 3p souls are immaterial, like numbers are immaterial. You are the one doing a grand ontological commitment. You are the one assuming Matter, instead of trying to prove your case. And you can do this, except if you keep the Digital Mechanist hypothesis. In that case we can no more interpret any empirical experience as an evidence that there is a primitive empirical reality. That was already understood by many people before materialism became a (christian) dogma. > > > so your question is badly formulated or ambiguous. > > Yes Captain Obvious, the question is badly formulated and ambiguous. But I'm > not the one making the inability to answer the "question" the foundation of > his entire philosophy, you are. > > > But things are very simple. > > Yes indeed things are very simple, but that word has 2 meanings, one is > uncomplicated but the other is stupid. > > > Yesterday, a computationalist has put on the annihilation copy button. He > > predicted that he will feel to be in only once city, but that he was > > incapable of saying with certainty which one in particular. > > He can't give the answer not because he doesn't know it but because badly > formulated or ambiguous questions have no answer and are in fact not > questions at all, they are gibberish. > > > By definition of the correct first person prediction, > > There is no coherent consistent definition of THE correct first person if > First Person Duplication Machines are involved. But no first person duplication is possible *from* the first person point of view. A duplication of first person is only a view from a 3p person. You can say, in Helsinki, you can contact me in Washington and in Moscow, tomorrow, but that does not mean that if someone contact you in Moscow, he/she automatically contact the copy in Washington. Bruno > > > That describes the protocol > > You have no "protocol", you have a self contradictory clown show. > > > the question of the prediction of the first person experience [...] > > And in your very next sentence you give an example of the clown show. > Protocol my ass. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0psNrN5ONh0Xy8A2_in7EVGZ7iHckheOjKSqEYEsMXpg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0psNrN5ONh0Xy8A2_in7EVGZ7iHckheOjKSqEYEsMXpg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A712ED17-B744-4659-ABE6-A2A9A8104A4E%40ulb.ac.be.
