On Tuesday, December 31, 2019 at 6:58:45 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 12/31/2019 4:37 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 31, 2019 at 5:25:38 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 12/31/2019 12:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> from ‘The Self’ – Galen Strawson, Journal of Consciousness Studies (1997) >> <https://www.academia.edu/18112359/_The_Self_> >> >> *In the 1990s many analytic philosophers were inclined to deny that the >> expression ‘the self’ referred to anything at all. Others said that its >> meaning was too unclear for it to be used in worthwhile philosophical >> discussion. A third group thought that the only legitimate use of ‘I’ and >> ‘the self’ was its use to refer to the human being considered as a whole. >> This paper rejects these views. It makes a proposal about how to endow ‘the >> self’ with sufficiently clear meaning without taking it to refer to the >> whole human being. One needs to begin with phenomenology, with >> self-experience, with the experience of there being such a thing as the >> self. One can then approach the questions about metaphysics of the >> self—questions about the existence and nature of the self—in the light of >> the discussion of the phenomenology of the self.* >> >> … >> >> Genuine, realistic materialism requires acknowledgement that the >> phenomena of conscious experience are, considered specifically as such, >> wholly physical, as physical as the phenomena of extension and electricity >> as studied by physics. This in turn requires the acknowledgement that >> current physics, considered as a general account of the nature of the >> physical, is like Hamlet without the prince, or at least like Othello >> without Desdemona. No one who doubts this is a serious materialist, as far >> as I can see. Anyone who has had a standard modern (Western) education is >> likely to experience a feeling of deep bewilderment—category-blasting >> amazement—when entering into serious materialism, and considering the >> question ‘What is the nature of the physical?’ in the context of the >> thought that the mental (and in particular the experiential) is physical; >> followed, perhaps, by a deep, pragmatic agnosticism. >> >> Even if we grant that there is a phenomenon that is reasonably picked out >> by the phrase ‘mental self’, why should we accept that the right thing to >> say about some two-second-long mental-self phenomenon is (a) that it is a >> thing or object like a rock or a tiger? Why can’t we insist that the right >> thing to say is simply (b) that an enduring (‘physical’) object—Louis—has a >> certain property, or (c) that a two-second mental-self phenomenon is just a >> matter of a certain process occurring in an object—so that it is not itself >> a distinct object existing for two seconds? >> >> I think that a proper understanding of materialism strips (b) and (c) of >> any appearance of superiority to (a). As for (c): any claim to the effect >> that a mental self is best thought >> of as a process rather than an object can be countered by saying that >> there is no sense in which a mental self is a process in which a rock is >> not also and equally a process. So if a rock is a paradigm case of a thing >> in spite of being a process, we have no good reason not to say the same of >> a mental self. >> >> >> This is specious and disingenuous. It's another version of the rock that >> computes everything and Strawson must know better. >> >> But if there is a process, there must be something—an object or >> substance—in which it goes on. If something happens, there must be >> something to which it happens, something which is not just the happening >> itself. This expresses our ordinary understanding of things, but physicists >> are increasingly content with the view that physical reality is itself a >> kind of pure process—even if it remains hard to know exactly what this idea >> amounts to. The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which things >> happen has increasingly ceded to the idea that the existence of anything >> worthy of the name ‘ultimate stuff’ consists in the existence of fields of >> energy — consists, in other words, in the existence of a kind of pure >> process which is not usefully thought of as something which is happening to >> a thing distinct from it. >> >> As for (b): the object/property distinction is, as Russell says of the >> standard distinction between mental and physical, ‘superficial and unreal’ >> (1927: 402). >> >> And Russell proposed neutral monism in which the world consists of events >> which can be ordered into either the mental life of persons (and animals) >> or ordered into physical evolutions, i.e. world lines. Matter would a >> subset of the physical orderings. It wouldn't be the fundamental ontology >> and so the "neutral" in "neutral monism" meant it was neither mentalism nor >> materialism. >> >> Brent >> >> Chronic philosophical difficulties with the question of how to express >> the relation between substance and property provide strong negative support >> for this view. However ineluctable it is for us, it seems that the >> distinction must be as superficial as we must take the distinction between >> the wavelike nature and particlelike nature of fundamental particles to be. >> >> Obviously more needs to be said, but Kant seems to have got it exactly >> right in a single clause: ‘in their relation to substance, [accidents] are >> not in fact subordinated to it, but are the manner of existence of the >> substance itself’. >> ---------- >> >> >> @philipthrift >> -- >> >> > > I talk about the dialectics of *language* and matter - but still matter > is everything there is, or in the terms it's expressed in Wikipedia in [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism ] ... > > but *neutral monism* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism ] > (however it's presented) has always seemed like complete hogwash to me. > > > A strongly worded opinion...but not a reason. > > Brent >
As you have seen, I've been writing on this on Vic's blog and its continuation for 20 years. (If you were paying attention.) *There is no such thing as mind* (in the way* it is represented in neutral dualism) - just as Rorty wrote in "Persons Without Minds" in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. *You must have read that chapter by now. There is only physical reality - no alternative, separate, mental reality - just in the way Strawson writes. You've seen me refer to that Rorty chapter for 20 years now. (If you were paying attention.) I don't know what more you want to convince you that neural monism is woo woo. * Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with the more familiar versions of monism: idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ @philipthfit -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5dbda963-bca2-4f0e-88a1-490c23aeeab2%40googlegroups.com.
