On Wednesday, January 1, 2020 at 2:30:27 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 31, 2019 at 6:58:45 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 12/31/2019 4:37 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, December 31, 2019 at 5:25:38 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/31/2019 12:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> from ‘The Self’ – Galen Strawson, Journal of Consciousness Studies >>> (1997) <https://www.academia.edu/18112359/_The_Self_> >>> >>> *In the 1990s many analytic philosophers were inclined to deny that the >>> expression ‘the self’ referred to anything at all. Others said that its >>> meaning was too unclear for it to be used in worthwhile philosophical >>> discussion. A third group thought that the only legitimate use of ‘I’ and >>> ‘the self’ was its use to refer to the human being considered as a whole. >>> This paper rejects these views. It makes a proposal about how to endow ‘the >>> self’ with sufficiently clear meaning without taking it to refer to the >>> whole human being. One needs to begin with phenomenology, with >>> self-experience, with the experience of there being such a thing as the >>> self. One can then approach the questions about metaphysics of the >>> self—questions about the existence and nature of the self—in the light of >>> the discussion of the phenomenology of the self.* >>> >>> … >>> >>> Genuine, realistic materialism requires acknowledgement that the >>> phenomena of conscious experience are, considered specifically as such, >>> wholly physical, as physical as the phenomena of extension and electricity >>> as studied by physics. This in turn requires the acknowledgement that >>> current physics, considered as a general account of the nature of the >>> physical, is like Hamlet without the prince, or at least like Othello >>> without Desdemona. No one who doubts this is a serious materialist, as far >>> as I can see. Anyone who has had a standard modern (Western) education is >>> likely to experience a feeling of deep bewilderment—category-blasting >>> amazement—when entering into serious materialism, and considering the >>> question ‘What is the nature of the physical?’ in the context of the >>> thought that the mental (and in particular the experiential) is physical; >>> followed, perhaps, by a deep, pragmatic agnosticism. >>> >>> Even if we grant that there is a phenomenon that is reasonably picked >>> out by the phrase ‘mental self’, why should we accept that the right thing >>> to say about some two-second-long mental-self phenomenon is (a) that it is >>> a thing or object like a rock or a tiger? Why can’t we insist that the >>> right thing to say is simply (b) that an enduring (‘physical’) >>> object—Louis—has a certain property, or (c) that a two-second mental-self >>> phenomenon is just a matter of a certain process occurring in an object—so >>> that it is not itself a distinct object existing for two seconds? >>> >>> I think that a proper understanding of materialism strips (b) and (c) of >>> any appearance of superiority to (a). As for (c): any claim to the effect >>> that a mental self is best thought >>> of as a process rather than an object can be countered by saying that >>> there is no sense in which a mental self is a process in which a rock is >>> not also and equally a process. So if a rock is a paradigm case of a thing >>> in spite of being a process, we have no good reason not to say the same of >>> a mental self. >>> >>> >>> This is specious and disingenuous. It's another version of the rock >>> that computes everything and Strawson must know better. >>> >>> But if there is a process, there must be something—an object or >>> substance—in which it goes on. If something happens, there must be >>> something to which it happens, something which is not just the happening >>> itself. This expresses our ordinary understanding of things, but physicists >>> are increasingly content with the view that physical reality is itself a >>> kind of pure process—even if it remains hard to know exactly what this idea >>> amounts to. The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which things >>> happen has increasingly ceded to the idea that the existence of anything >>> worthy of the name ‘ultimate stuff’ consists in the existence of fields of >>> energy — consists, in other words, in the existence of a kind of pure >>> process which is not usefully thought of as something which is happening to >>> a thing distinct from it. >>> >>> As for (b): the object/property distinction is, as Russell says of the >>> standard distinction between mental and physical, ‘superficial and unreal’ >>> (1927: 402). >>> >>> And Russell proposed neutral monism in which the world consists of >>> events which can be ordered into either the mental life of persons (and >>> animals) or ordered into physical evolutions, i.e. world lines. Matter >>> would a subset of the physical orderings. It wouldn't be the fundamental >>> ontology and so the "neutral" in "neutral monism" meant it was neither >>> mentalism nor materialism. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> Chronic philosophical difficulties with the question of how to express >>> the relation between substance and property provide strong negative support >>> for this view. However ineluctable it is for us, it seems that the >>> distinction must be as superficial as we must take the distinction between >>> the wavelike nature and particlelike nature of fundamental particles to be. >>> >>> Obviously more needs to be said, but Kant seems to have got it exactly >>> right in a single clause: ‘in their relation to substance, [accidents] are >>> not in fact subordinated to it, but are the manner of existence of the >>> substance itself’. >>> ---------- >>> >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> -- >>> >>> >> >> I talk about the dialectics of *language* and matter - but still matter >> is everything there is, or in the terms it's expressed in Wikipedia in [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism ] ... >> >> but *neutral monism* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism ] >> (however it's presented) has always seemed like complete hogwash to me. >> >> >> A strongly worded opinion...but not a reason. >> >> Brent >> > > > > As you have seen, I've been writing on this on Vic's blog and its > continuation for 20 years. > > (If you were paying attention.) > > *There is no such thing as mind* (in the way* it is represented in > neutral dualism) - just as Rorty wrote in "Persons Without Minds" in > *Philosophy > and the Mirror of Nature. *You must have read that chapter by now. There > is only physical reality - no alternative, separate, mental reality - just > in the way Strawson writes. > > You've seen me refer to that Rorty chapter for 20 years now. (If you were > paying attention.) > > I don't know what more you want to convince you that neural monism is woo > woo. > > * Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality > is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with the > more familiar versions of monism: idealism and materialism. What > distinguishes neutral monism from its monistic rivals is the claim that the > intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This > negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically > neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be > neutral between the two. > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ > > @philipthfit > > >
Where to people get the idea that there are any *non-material things*? It's baffled me to see that people believe in that all my life (or since high school days anyway). It's just plain weird. I guess I will go through 2020 seeing more of that kind of thing. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b25ea8bd-b22b-4696-86fe-30eb1e1c4ce3%40googlegroups.com.
