> On 8 Feb 2020, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 3:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sat, 8 Feb 2020 at 11:16, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 4:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, 7 Feb 2020 at 15:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > This argument from Kent completely destroys Everett's attempt to derive the > Born rule from his many-worlds approach to quantum mechanics. In fact, it > totally undermines most attempts to derive the Born rule from any branching > theory, and undermines attempts to justify ignoring branches on which the > Born rule weights are disconfirmed. In the many-worlds case, recall, all > observers are aware that other observers with other data must exist, but each > is led to construct a spurious measure of importance that favours their own > observations against the others', and this leads to an obvious absurdity. In > the one-world case, observers treat what actually happened as important, and > ignore what didn't happen: this doesn't lead to the same difficulty. > > Nevertheless Many Worlds is at least logically possible. What would the > inhabitants expect to see, if not the world we currently see? > > > Many-worlds might be logically possible, but it is also completely useless. > If every possible outcome from any experiment/interaction actually occurs, > then the total data that results is independent of any probability measure. > Consequently, one cannot use data from experiments to infer anything about > any underlying probabilities, even if such exist at all. In particular, > Many-worlds is incompatible with the Born rule, and with the overwhelming > amount of evidence confirming the Born rule in quantum mechanics. So > Many-worlds (and Everett) is a failed theory, disconfirmed by every > experiment ever performed. If Many-worlds is correct, then the inhabitants > have no basis on which to have any expectations about what they might see. > > So are you suggesting that the inhabitants would just see chaos? > > > No, I am suggesting that Many-worlds is a failed theory, unable to account > for everyday experience. A stochastic single-world theory is perfectly able > to account for what we see.
Only by assuming a non-mechanist theory of mind, but then you have a problem with Darwin, Molecular -biology and even the SWE. That is like adding magic to keep a metaphysics consistent, when it is not. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRayauDsetT9onmUf1%2B%2BN3CZ%2B8V%3DuGS_3aSXL3E%3Dc4SXA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRayauDsetT9onmUf1%2B%2BN3CZ%2B8V%3DuGS_3aSXL3E%3Dc4SXA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C8E20CC4-00D2-4567-97D0-7C3A332CA2B5%40ulb.ac.be.
