> On 25 Feb 2020, at 05:06, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2020 at 6:55:59 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 24 Feb 2020, at 05:44, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 5:08:16 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 21 Feb 2020, at 14:25, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, February 21, 2020 at 3:40:51 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 21:59, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I think Bruce's position is that quantum processes are inherently random >>>> and thus NOT computable. Doesn't this conclusion, if true, totally >>>> disconfirm Bruno's theory that the apparent physical universe comes into >>>> being by computations of arithmetic pre-existing principles or postulates? >>>> AG >>> On the contrary, Mechanism reduces the apparent indeterminacy to the >>> computable. With mechanism, things might be too much non computable, when >>> you take the first person indeterminacy into account. Then the math shows >>> that this refutation of mechanism does not work, as the computations are >>> done with the exact redundancy making the physical reality enough >>> computable to get stable histories. >>> >>> Mechanism entails that the physical reality cannot be entirely computed, >>> like it predicted that no piece of matter can be cloned. Indeed, it emerges >>> from a non computable statistics on infinitely many computation, which are >>> not algorithmically recognisable in arithmetic. We can test mechanism by >>> measuring its degree of non computability. Too much computable would be >>> more problematic than too much non-computable. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> I really can't follow the above. What I understand by mechanism (as you >>> define it), is that the human nervous system, and presumably a human being, >>> can be duplicated by computers. >> Yes. If you want, we could define a mechanist practitioners as someone >> accepting an artificial prosthesis, like an artificial heart (a pump), or an >> artificial kidney ( filter machine), etc. A mechanist is then someone >> accepting this whatever organ is concerned, and in particular an artificial >> and digital brain. >>> If that's what you mean, can you explain each sentence above. For example, >>> how does mechanism reduce the apparent indeterminacy to the computable? And >>> so forth. AG >> Self-duplication is made possible by the Digital Mechanism. If you agree >> that with self-duplication, >> >> I don't. Although it has some plausibility, there's no way that arithmetic >> alone can CREATE space and time. A computer can create "points" in a >> hypothetical grid, and various types of distance formulas, but it cannot >> create space or time. > Arithmetic cannot create space and time. I agree with you. That would be > rather magical indeed. > > Then arithmetic cannot create other worlds! End of story. Case closed. AG
It creates all the individual and collective stories. The case would be close if you could prove the existence of a world, but if you are a consistent machine (to be short), then incompleteness precludes this. Even intuitively, you can understand that no one can prove the existence of anything from scratch. We need to assume some theories, and with mechanism, eventually we have to abandon the idea of an ontological physical universe. Still, we get an explanation of where the illusion comes from, and why it is lawful, etc. > > But once you assume digital mechanism, > > If arithmetic can't create other worlds, it throws grave doubt that digital > mechanism is true. AG It “creates” all computations, which includes (as we assume mechanism here) all the computations simulating your brain right now. We don’t need an ontological physical universe, once we can explain the physical laws in terms of histories which are emulated in arithmetic. We need only to test if the statistics obtained match what we see. (And thanks to QM-without-collapse), ir fits rather well up to now. > > and once you understand that the simple arithmetical truth emulates all > computations, you can understand that arithmetic create the experience of > space-time, and indeed, with, apparently until now, the right redundancy > which explain the “many-world” aspect of the physical reality, and that is > confirmed mathematically, in the sense that we recover quantum logic for the > logic of experimental s-certainty, relatively to the computational states > accessible from arithmetic, by universal numbers/machines “living” in there. > The quantum is explained by the digital “seen from inside”. We get the qubits > for the bits when seen from the bits, roughly speaking. >> BTW, what's your definition of physicalism? AG > The idea that physics is the fundamental science. > > With mechanism, this does not work, (I can show this), and we have to explain > the “illusion of a physical world” by a statistic on all machine “dreams", > where a dream is just a computation rich enough to support a “self-aware > observer” > > So, with a false theory of mechanism, or digital mechanism, and arithmetic > which you admit can't create space (and probably time as well), you claim to > derive a self-aware observer? AG Yes, because that is an attribute of the person attached to the machine, and I got them by using the oldest definition of the knower, given by Theaetetus to socrates. Socrates demolish that theory, but the incompleteness theorem refutes Socrates’ refutation. I model rational belief by Gödel’s provability predicate, which is a normal thing to do, because incompleteness prevents it to be a knowledge predicate, and so it is a sort of rational belief. "I know p” is modelled by “(I prove) p and p’. That obeys the axiom of knowledge, but also make the “knower” non nameable, which confirms many theories already existing, and is a startling feature of knowledge, which appears to be non definable by the machine, and private. > > (which can be defined in arithmetic by a consistent machine having enough > rich cognitive abilities (precisely: believing in enough induction axioms, if > you have heard about theories like Peano arithmetic, or Zermelo-Fraenkel set > theory, those are typical examples of such digital (immaterial) machine. > > Yes, I am aware of those axioms, and, as I have written, Peano's axioms imply > arithmetic, but not IMO, of other worlds. AG I write PA for Peano’s axiom (or theorems). Concerning the (standard) model of arithmetic, PA can only scratch the surface, and ZF, despite proving much more, can also only scratch the surface of the arithmetical reality/standard-model. But PA you can prove the existence of an infinity of computations going through your state right now, and that includes your feeling that there is a physical universe out there, but in this case, we know that it is not the case, and so it could be “not the case” for you right here and now too. You miss the work of the logicians in the 1930s, that is the discovery in mathematics, and then in arithmetic, of the universal machines and all its activities. Just to give a little example, you can encode the truth that “the machine register ( a, b , c) contains b, by the arithmetical proposition saying that the number (3^b divides A, and (3^b+1) does not) with: A = (2^”a”)*(3^”b”)*(5^”c”), with 2, 3, 5, … being the prime factors, so that we can exploit the prime factorisation theorem (truth) to be sure this is not ambiguous. The expression “a”, “b” , “c” denotes some preliminary encoding of the letters a, b and c with numbers. A universal machine cannot see or feel the difference between being run by this or that universal machinery, and the theory eventually predict that below its substitution level, she has to see the symptoms of infinitely many histories, coming from all computations, run in arithmetic, going through your state and having refined description of the computations. We can come back on this. Bruno > > With mechanism, physics is reduced to computer science or to arithmetic, in > the same sense that for most educated people today think that biology can be > reduced to physics, in principle of course. > > My first older result is simply that mechanism (the idea that we could > survive with a digital brain/body) is incompatible with weak-materialism or > with physicalism (the idea that there is a physical universe having a > fundamental ontology, not reducible to any other science). > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > >> like in the Washington-Moscoow thought experiment, the person is unable to >> predict his immediate particular personal future feeling, despite being >> certain (assuming Mechanism and all default hyoptheses) that it will be >> either like feeling to be in Moscow or like feeling to be in Washington, >> then you understand that mechanism entails the existence of a personal, >> subjective (first person) indeterminacy. >> >> Then you will need to understand that the elementary arithmetical truth >> implement all computations (including all quantum computations, notably), in >> the original sense of Turing, Church, Kleene (cf the 1930s papers), which >> makes us, in any “here and now” indexical state, indeterminate on which >> computations continue us, making eventually the physical science as a >> statistics on all (relative) computations, among an infinity (which are >> indeed realised in that elementary part of arithmetic). >> >> >> >>> >>> On of the things I seriously dislike about MW, which makes it utterly >>> REPELLENT (Steven Weinberg's word), is that there are too many damned >>> worlds! For example, when one considers the worlds created when putting on >>> left or right shoe first, this just scratches the surface of how many >>> worlds are created -- not just two worlds, but uncountably many (if space >>> is continuous) when one considers how many distinct worlds are created just >>> for the case of the left shoe first. I am referring to the uncountably many >>> ways to put on one's left shoe first. For me, this is hardly an ELEGANT >>> Cosmos, but rather a downright SILLY one! AG >> >> When you decide to put the left shoes, in bot “quantum Mechanism” à-la >> Everett, or in arithmetic, only the consistent extensions must be taken into >> account, and if you decide to put the left shoe, you will put in all >> continuation that left shoe. Both the quantum and the purely Mechanist frame >> does not make everything happening, only the consistent (with you local >> belief) extension will occur, in the vast majority of extensions. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3fa2279f-05dc-4602-9e88-78c1a36eda45%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3fa2279f-05dc-4602-9e88-78c1a36eda45%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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